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Abstract 
One effective way to compare the fruits of biblical Christianity with modernism is to 
contrast the ideologies and outcomes of the American and French Revolutions. 
Pre-revolutionary America was rich with biblical influence.  Adherents of both 
Protestantism and Deism sought a “Christian society,” and while revolutionaries drew from both 
biblical Reformation and secular Enlightenment thought, much of the latter was biblical thought 
in secular form.  Ministers employed the Bible extensively to support the Revolution.  This 
relative theological consensus encouraged religious practice and a political system that 
accommodated dispute.  Human rights were secure thanks to man’s subordinate position under 
God.  Even after much secularization, the state has protected the religious rights of groups and 
parents.  America has enjoyed consistent political freedom and stability as well as unparalleled 
economic and military strength. 
In pre-revolutionary France, the Catholic Church suppressed Reformation thought and 
bound itself to the monarchy.  Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet insisted the Bible was not to be 
trusted.  Rousseau replaced God with an absolute notion of Reason.  Cabanis replaced religion 
with “scientific” ideology.  The results were severe anticlericalism and a militant form of 
secularism known as laïcité.  The Cult of Reason predicted unanimity, and the Cult of the 
Nation transformed liberty into conformity with Reason.  Instead of limiting power, the French 
consolidated it and swerved between failed attempts at republicanism and either empire or 
restored monarchy.  Economically, capitalism came later and remained weaker.  French 
religious policy has restricted both religious groups and individual public practice. 
The research indicates that biblical influence in a society is the greatest guarantor of 
liberty, economic prosperity, and freedom of practice for all religions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last century-and-a-half, the United States has experienced a secularization of 
culture and society.  Differing opinions over the intended nature and proper expression of the 
separation of church and state have led to contentious debates over the role of the Bible and 
associated icons and themes in government, schools, public grounds, and even the practices of 
deployed military personnel.  As a result, not only biblical ethics and morals, but also biblical 
metaphysical assertions are increasingly excluded from public discourse in favor of what some 
consider a more “objective” secular philosophy. 
If, however, the philosophical assertions of the Bible are responsible for the positive 
political and economic outcomes in the United States, and if the corresponding modernist 
philosophical assumptions behind the French Revolution were responsible for their rapid 
devolution to the Reign of Terror and authoritarian rule of Napoleon Bonaparte, then the 
secularization of American society could have disastrous results. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore and compare the fruits of modernity (including 
postmodernism) with those of biblical Christianity.  In particular, this thesis will compare the 
philosophical presuppositions behind modernity (atheism, naturalism, materialism, and 
reductionism) to the philosophical presuppositions promoted in the Bible (theism, 
supernaturalism, and the importance of biblical revelation).  The ultimate hope is to compare the 
relative historical fruits of the Bible and modernity throughout the modern era, roughly the last 
five centuries.  Because philosophies bear “fruit” through historical events, the object of study 
can include many revolutionary changes in society (in a broad sense—not strictly “revolutionary 
wars”). The scope could, therefore, include events in Reformation Germany, the English Civil 
War, the Glorious “Bloodless” Revolution, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the 
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Bolshevik Revolution, post-WWI Fascism and Nazism, the Maoist Revolution, the 1960’s 
counter-culture “Hippie” movement, and even Liberation Theology.  Unfortunately, this is far 
too broad for the scope of a single thesis. 
 This comparison will, therefore, focus on the American and French Revolutions, first 
identifying the fundamental philosophical underpinnings that each Revolution built on, then 
comparing the outcomes of each Revolution, and finally attempting to identify whether there 
may be a causal relationship between the philosophical assumptions and the revolutionary 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 - “Secular” Thought 
 
 Before analyzing the American and French Revolutions, it is important to define and 
analyze terms clearly.  In particular, most such analyses of both Revolutions revolve around 
degrees of secularism, so any fair comparison requires a clear understanding of the concept and 
its variations.  Unfortunately, secularism is often misunderstood and sometimes vilified.  It is 
not, after all, a mere “absence of religion” any more than it is a “lack of religion.”  It is actually 
much more difficult to define.1 
 
Early History of Secular Thought 
 
 The history of secular thought is far longer than many realize, and it is also more closely 
tied to Christianity than one might think based on debates over the topic.  It may be said to have 
its roots in the Greek philosophical schools.  During the Socratic era, intellectual thought first 
began to pull away from conventional religious thought, and an “antagonism” developed 
“between natural philosophy and religion.”2  Subsequent to this, two personalities stood out for 
having done much to establish secular thought.  The first was Augustine of Hippo; the second, 
Thomas Aquinas. 
 In the 5th century, Augustine tackled difficult questions of political and religious theory in 
an age where Christians--many of whom had expected Jesus to return by that time--were 
struggling to determine how best to live in the world while awaiting His return.  In his analysis, 
Augustine established a distinction between the City of God (God’s perfect kingdom to come, 
for which the church prepares humanity) and the City of Man (the province of the state and 
                                               
1 Craig Calhoun, "Rethinking Secularism," The Hedgehog Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 35, accessed July 10, 
2016, http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048. 
2 Keulman, Kenneth, Review of Western Atheism: A Short History, Journal of Church and State 42, no. 3 
(2000):  577, accessed August 20, 2016, http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048. 
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worldly rulers).  He never intended, however, to “banish religion from ‘secular’ affairs.”3  
Rather, he reflected on 1) Jesus's command to "give to Caesar" and 2) Paul's command to honor 
God-ordained authorities in view of the fact that Rome had been sacked and Jesus had not yet 
returned.   
The sacking of Rome in 410 CE was a traumatic event similar to the 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon in impact to the psyche.  Both events ushered in new and 
innovative thought on politics and security.  Since the prevailing world order was collapsing and 
Jesus had not yet returned, Augustine sought to identify how Christians were to regard the state’s 
authority.  His dualism was more between the love of God and love of self than it was between 
church and state,4 but it certainly made room for the latter.  As a result, Jesus’s teachings, Paul’s 
application of them, and Augustine’s interpretations of both all combined to make room for a 
“secular” state separate from the Church. 
During the 13th century, eight centuries after Augustine and only a short time after the 
zenith of Roman Catholic power, Thomas Aquinas served as a priest, Dominican friar, 
theologian, and philosopher.  Because he introduced (or perhaps “re-introduced”) Aristotle’s 
writings to European culture and philosophy,5 he did much to lay the foundation for later 
Renaissance and Enlightenment thought.  An entire philosophical school, known as Thomism, 
arose from his work, and one of his presuppositions was that “truth” was to be accepted, no 
matter the source.  The philosophical problem, of course, is how one defines or confirms the 
veracity of any claim to truth.  Because of his assertion, European intellectuals and theologians 
elevated the Socratic philosophers to a plane equal to the Apostles and the Scriptures. 
                                               
3 Calhoun, "Rethinking Secularism," 38. 
4 Emmet Kennedy, "The Tangled History of Secularism," Modern Age 42, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 32, 
accessed July 9, 2016, http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048. 
5 Kennedy, "The Tangled History of Secularism," 32. 
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Another of Aquinas’s contributions was a “distinction between reason and faith” based 
on the writings of an Andalusian, Islamic philosopher, Abu Walid Muhammad bin Ahmad bin 
Rushd, whose name is often Latinized as Averroes.  Because of this distinction between reason 
and faith, subsequent philosophers presupposed them to be antithetical, rather than 
complementary.6  In a real sense, then, Averroes and Aquinas laid the foundation for 
Kierkegaard’s later concept of “blind faith,” a conflation of faith with the postmodern 
abandonment of reason. 
With Aquinas, the distinction between sacred and secular took a specific philosophical 
turn.  Augustine had made room for secular institutions of state distinct from the Church, 
something Christians were already accustomed to since the Church had grown under “pagan” 
Roman rule.  Aquinas forced the distinction further, making the Church the province of faith 
apart from reason, and the state the province of reason apart from faith.  This made room for 
truth-claims within the Church that no longer required the support of reason, and it likewise 
made room for truth claims in the state that could be completely antithetical to Scripture. 
As time went on, modern philosophers concluded God could not be apprehended through 
reason or rationalism.  “The world was secularized in that morality, religion, and politics were 
excluded from rational analysis and nature was mechanized.”7  In fact, the growing body of 
secular thought began to turn against its religious roots.  Even the “atheists of classical antiquity” 
began to offer a “naturalistic explanation for the origins of religion--an attitude that persists in 
the critique of theism.”8   
 
  
                                               
6 Keulman, Review of Western Atheism, 578. 
7 Kennedy, "The Tangled History of Secularism," 34. 
8 Keulman, Review of Western Atheism, 578. 
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Secularism and Political Theory 
 
By the time of the Renaissance (14th and 15th centuries), atheistic and agnostic 
speculation that had previously been “at odds with ecclesiastical institutions” found expression, 
and modern political theory (the thoughts of the writers who inspired the American and French 
Revolutions) began to take form.  Some regard Machiavelli, for example, as “a potent source” of 
atheism, particularly in his separation of moral virtue (especially of the sovereign) from Christian 
thought or anthropology.9  While Machiavelli was no friend to modern democratic thought, he 
set the stage for it by reminding his pupil, Lorenzo de Medici, that the people can collectively 
turn on a prince.  In a real sense, then, even “subjects” have some say in their own government.  
In terms of religious thought, however, Machiavelli (and to a lesser extent, Thomas Hobbes), 
concluded religion was not useful in the political sphere.10  For Machiavelli, a truly Christian 
morality would only weaken a prince and therefore undermine his power.  He reasoned that 
immoral (or at least amoral) actions on the part of a prince could serve the moral purpose of 
promoting security. 
By the 17th century, even more overtly Christian writings further developed thought on 
the relationship between church and state, sacred and secular.  John Locke developed a 
secularized version of Richard Hooker’s expressly Protestant Christian philosophy.  Like 
Hooker, Locke concluded the government should not establish a religion (though he almost 
certainly presupposed any “religion” would be a Christian one).11  This form of secular thought 
sought to keep the state out of the Church, so to speak, without preventing the latter from 
influencing the former.  The Reformation had developed various denominational expressions of 
                                               
9 Ibid. 
10 Kennedy, "The Tangled History of Secularism," 33. 
11 Ibid., 34. 
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the Church, so political theorists sought a way to maintain a level playing field for their ideas to 
compete.  The “pluralism of society” required some kind of “neutrality, or ‘principled distance’” 
on the part of the state.12 
By this time, then, at least two distinct visions of “secularism” developed--one that made 
a distinction between church and state and another that divorced them completely.  One obvious 
reason was the increasing development of atheistic thought in clear opposition to various 
expressions of theism.  A second reason stemmed from the two opposing historical events that 
followed the Renaissance.  The 16th century saw the Protestant Reformation in northern Europe, 
which split the reformers from Vatican authority.  The 17th century then saw a resurgence of 
speculative (and often atheistic) thought in the Enlightenment. 
 
Secularism and Progress 
 
A common thread worthy of analysis among these historical movements is progress. 
Several societies have each seen impressive scientific movements, for example, but unlike the 
modern scientific movement in the West, they did not persist.  Some fell victim to the fatalism 
inherent to their worldview of continuity between humanity, divinity, and nature.  If nature is 
subject to the whims of the gods, who in turn are both enslaved to their natural roles and at least 
occasionally responsive to human manipulation, there is no room for objective science.  Another 
such scientific movement fell victim to the fatalism inherent to Islamic doctrine.  Since Islam 
calls for mankind to accept both good and evil from Allah without question, since there is no 
express promise of salvation in the Qur’an, and since Allah had changed His mind more than 
once about critical matters (leading to the doctrine of abrogation), there could be no optimistic 
                                               
12 Charles Taylor, “The Meaning of Secularism,” The Hedgehog Review (Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Culture), (Fall, 2010): 23, accessed June 30, 2016, http://iasc-culture.org/THR/archives/Fall2010/Taylor_lo.pdf. 
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expectation of rational order in the universe.  Even in Europe, early scientific exploration was 
losing steam.  While the Renaissance had seen impressive scientific development, by the end of 
his life, even Leonardo da Vinci had abandoned scientific inquiry for art.   
Reformation thought took science to new heights.  The greatest leap forward came with 
the Reformation figure, Isaac Newton, whose book, Principia Mathematica, laid the 
philosophical foundation for modern science.  Newton built on a realist epistemology that 
embraced objective reality (and therefore, objective truth), as well as the subject-object 
distinction.  Both of these stemmed directly from the biblical theology of the transcendent God, 
as well as from the optimism that resulted from salvation by grace.  If God is eternal and 
unchanging, if He expresses Himself both spiritually and naturally, and if His (spiritual) Word 
leads to spiritual redemption and salvation, then His natural work in creation may also be 
understood and its challenges overcome.  As a result, scientific progress surged forward. 
Enlightenment thinkers built on Newton’s foundation, but they transposed the realist 
epistemology from its theological foundation to a naturalist, materialist base.  Scientific 
“progress” continued but without its metaphysical foundation.  Eventually, science became 
objectified as the sole, reliable source of knowledge, and its theological foundations were 
relegated to the “irrational” realm of faith.  Enlightenment thought came to contrast reason to 
“unenlightened versions of faith,” and many committed to “comprehensive rationality, the 
supremacy not just of logic and empirical research but also of systematic, thorough, and 
exclusive reliance on them.”13  By the 18th century, the years leading to the Revolutionary Era, 
Enlightenment thought, having abandoned its theological roots, grew in direct opposition to 
Catholic authority, especially in southern Europe.14 
                                               
13 Calhoun, "Rethinking Secularism," 42. 
14 Keulman, Review of Western Atheism, 578. 
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Not only did technical, scientific progress find its way from a Reformation base to a 
materialistic one, but also the Reformation’s eschatological, millenarian view of history.  
Reformation theologians looked to a utopian future with Christ’s return, and with the 
Reformation, they began to see impressive technical and social improvements.  Enlightenment 
thinkers likewise embraced a “secular millenarian” view of the future that embodied humanistic 
notions of progress on a materialistic base, liberated from the social restraints of theology.  
Enlightenment philosophers “encouraged independent social behavior” by first emphasizing a 
hope that change would necessarily mean progress or improvement.  Here, instead of being a 
product of careful thought and hard work, progress became an inevitable result of change.  This 
made room for all manner of nihilistic, revolutionary thought because even destructive change 
was expected to bring “progress.”  Second, they emphasized a hope in a “utopian ethic” that 
would lead to “technical progress to satisfy physical needs, moral progress to lessen violence, 
[and] political progress towards freedom, equality, and justice.”15  By the 19th century, this 
theory of progress found bold expression in Marx’s restatement of the Hegelian dialectic:  that 
any conflict between “thesis” and “antithesis” necessarily led to the development of a higher 
“synthesis.” 
By the time of the Revolutionary Era (for purposes of this paper, from 1776 to 1804, 
when Napoleon became emperor), not only was there unprecedented scientific progress but also 
there was economic and political progress.  Adam Smith began with a biblical notion of 
stewardship of property and constructed a rational argument for liberal economic theory.  His 
theory led to tremendous economic progress, but the results were tragically uneven.  Jean 
                                               
15 Jean Bauberot, "Secularism and French Religious Liberty:  A Sociological and Historical View," 
Brigham Young University Law Review 2003, no. 2 (2003): 456, accessed July 9, 2016, 
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048. 
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Bauberot, a French historian and sociologist, noted that economic liberalism produced a “world 
market encircled by a vast shantytown.”16  Likewise, philosophers (and theologians) like 
Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Calvin developed political theory in a world where 
power was shifting from the monarchy to the growing middle class. 
By the end of the Reformation and the start of the Enlightenment [for purposes of this 
paper, the early 17th century], scientific progress, economic liberalism, and political liberalism all 
occurred as parallel social and cultural phenomena.  It was the different theories of progress, 
however--biblical vs. humanistic--that led to the widest divergence in where this progress led.  
Where the prevailing theory of progress was more humanistic and “inevitable,” the “gulf 
between the ideal and reality” in capitalism (that is, its uneven economic outcomes) led some 
theorists to advocate “going beyond” capitalism to socialism to overcome the gulf.  “It is in this 
spirit that both Nazism and Communism can be referred to as ‘secular religions.’”17 
 
Secularism and “Civic Religion” 
 
 This leads to another component of secular thought worthy of analysis--the idea of civic 
religion.  As Dr. Mark Cladis, Brown University professor of Religious studies, put it: 
Benjamin Franklin endorsed a civil “Publick Religion” to inculcate civic virtue while at 
the same time he opposed any state-sponsored traditional religion.  And not long before 
the French Revolution, Rousseau condemned “blood thirsty,” nationalistic traditional 
religions even as he advocated an enforceable civil religion with tolerance as its 
centerpiece.18 
 
 James Madison is said to have interpreted Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms, civil 
and spiritual (an apparent restatement of Augustine’s thesis), as “an account of the separation of 
                                               
16 Bauberot, "Secularism and French Religious Liberty,” 458. 
17 Ibid., 457 
18 Mark Cladis, “Religion, Secularism, and Democratic Culture,” The Good Society 19, no. 2 (2010):  22, 
accessed June 30, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/goodsociety.19.2.0022. 
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church and state.”19  Of course, “Americans have passionately argued over the meaning and 
utility of the Wall of Separation.”20 A critical part of this discussion was the development of a 
“civil or political religion,” which, unlike confessional or traditional religion, “has the 
sociological and psychological form of traditional religion (enduring beliefs and practices, 
powerful ideas and symbols, tutored passions and emotions) but…does not have the traditionally 
religious content."21 
 Cladis refers to this as “civic religion” and defines it similarly as those aspects of a 
group’s civic life that take on the “sociological and psychological form of religion (deep beliefs 
and practices, ideas, and symbols, for example) without necessarily having any traditionally 
religious content."22 
 What is noteworthy for discussion here is that both the American Revolution and the 
French Revolution involved establishing some form of civic religion.  This was not necessarily 
meant to supplant or displace confessional religion, but rather to prevent historical excesses such 
as the British Puritan Interregnum or even Calvin’s reign in Geneva.  As such, most do not 
regard civic religion as “dangerous.”  Rather, “democratic civil religions offer protection from 
totalitarian and theocratic religion, among other varieties of antidemocratic movements.”23 
 
Secularization Theories (the Secularization Hypothesis) 
 
 This analysis has already shown that two overarching visions of secularism were 
developed throughout history.  The first made a distinction between church and state; the second 
sought to divorce them completely.  The first grew from a view of progress based on Protestant 
                                               
19 Ibid., 22. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Cladis, “Religion, Secularism, and Democratic Culture,” 22. 
22 Ibid., 22. 
23 Ibid. 
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eschatological views of the coming Millennial Reign of Christ, as well as on God’s providential 
work in and through society.  The second grew from a materialistic restatement of the Protestant 
view of progress, based instead on a humanistic belief in the inevitability of progress, whether 
social, economic, or political. 
 The second vision commonly found expression in “secularization theories.”  For 
example, Bauberot states this in mild form when he asserts that a society becomes “secularized” 
when there is “(1) a decrease in the portion of wealth devoted to the ‘supernatural’, (2) an 
increased independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the idea that social practices 
change living conditions, and (3) an increasing justification of institutions functioning with little 
or no tie to religion.”24 
Sometimes they are more explicit.  Bauberot defines four stages of “secularism”: 
 
1) [A]appropriation of ecclesiastical goods by the civil state.  For example, the Protestant 
Reformation saw this in the German Empire.  Also, the French Revolution saw the sale of 
Roman Catholic properties;   
2) “The rise of the “soft” human sciences, secularization theories, and the "paradox of 
outcomes," that capitalism (a fruit of religious thought) tends to pull people away from 
religion”; 
3) “the process [in the third quarter of the 20th Century] by which the sectors of society 
and culture are freed from the authority of religious institutions and symbols”; and 
4) “a more common, or ‘vulgar,’ vision of secularization [that] has made religion a sort of 
relic, destined to disappear sooner or later as the world's diverse societies proceed to 
modernity. 25   
 
This “vulgar” vision is secularization theory, which builds on the humanistic vision of 
progress and therefore assumes that religion is a “fad” that will pass away as people become 
more enlightened.  Bauberot notes that this fourth stage has proven to be wrong, for the turn of 
the last millennium turned out to be “furiously religious.”26  Forces of “counter-secularization,” 
                                               
24 Bauberot, “Secularism and French Religious Liberty,” 453. 
25 Ibid., 452-4. 
26 Ibid. 
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he says, have become just as significant.27  As Cladis put it, “We had assumed that modernity 
would necessarily usher in an age in which religion had no significant public standing. We were 
wrong. Religion as an intellectual, cultural, and political force is not, for the most part, waning 
on the globe.”28 
 The unfortunate result of secularization theory has been that “religious populations [have 
been] stigmatized—implicitly or explicitly—by these secularists, and religious resentment [has 
been] growing all around us.”29 
 
Fear of Religion and “Aggressive Secularism” 
 
 Closely related to secularization theory has been a growing distrust of religion vis-à-vis 
the state, particularly among those who embrace the second vision of secularism.  According to 
Cladis, “Political liberalism, broadly understood, has taken to heart the profound lesson that 
traditional or confessional religions can contribute to extremely dangerous political and social 
outcomes.” 30  By this, one might assume he is referring to the 30-Years War and similar 
conflicts arising from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, or perhaps to the failure of the 
British Interregnum.  He continues: 
 
We also know about the terror that can flow from a different kind of religion. In the 
twentieth century, catastrophic murder and suffering is associated with what some call 
political or civil religion, that is, with political and civil institutions that became charged 
with the sacred and functioned in many ways as a religion. Mussolini’s fascism, Hitler’s 
Nazism, and Russian Bolshevism have all been plausibly described as religious, when 
suitably defined by something like a broad, Durkheimian account of religion.31 
 
                                               
27 Ibid., 454. 
28 Cladis, “Religion, Secularism, and Democratic Culture,” 22. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
30 Ibid., 23. 
31 Ibid. 
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 Here, the “secular” assumption is that religion “is based on beliefs not subject to public 
reasoning,” and therefore “religion is potentially divisive.”  This leads to what he describes as 
the “standard liberal approach,” which is to “keep religion private,” that is, “to protect the secular 
state from encroaching religion by consigning religion to the private sphere—the sphere of the 
apolitical voluntary association, the family, or the individual.”32  According to this approach, the 
mere thought of religion in politics leads to fear and suspicion, so advocates “pursue aggressive 
laïcité or secularism and keep all religion out of political life.”33 
 The dark side of this approach is that, in the defense of liberalism, people must employ 
what Cladis refers to as “illiberal means” to achieve “privatization of religion.”  By forcing 
religion into the corner, advocates of this model also rob society of a priceless source of values, 
because “religious perspectives potentially have much to contribute to shared moral and political 
projects of nations and global communities.”34 
 
Secularism:  The Two Models 
 
 While some of the historical events analyzed here occurred much later than either 
revolution compared in this paper, they provide valuable insight into the philosophical 
foundations behind them--foundations that existed during the Revolutionary Era.  The two 
overarching models of secularism are therefore clear. 
 The first model followed a line of reasoning from Augustine to the Reformation.  It 
permitted (and eventually encouraged) a distinction between church and state.  It grew from a 
view of progress based on a Protestant Millenarian view of history in which God is working 
providentially in and through society toward a culmination in the Millennial Kingdom of Christ.  
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 24. 
34 Ibid., 23-24. 
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It held to a realist epistemology and a classical liberal approach to politics and economics.  
Rather than diminishing the importance of religion, it sought “the pluralization of religious 
forms” in which “religious entrepreneurs must compete” as a hallmark of secularization.35 
 In this model, religion played a vital, though possibly restrained, role.  According to 
Bauberot, this “secularism in the good sense” entailed three ideal features: 
1) when participating in the public and political realms, citizens do not normally assume 
that others necessarily share their religious perspectives or perspectives on religion;  
2) citizens do not treat religious perspectives in public debate as a special case subject to 
special exclusion or special privilege; and  
3) government neither officially sponsors nor hinders religion, upholding the First 
Amendment. The first two features of secularism (in the good sense) pertain to 
constraints on citizens, and the third on government.36 
 
 The second model of secularism followed a line of reasoning through Thomas Aquinas to 
a complete distinction between “reason” and “faith.”  Because it made room for truth claims in 
religion that are independent of reason and truth claims in the state that are antithetical to 
religion, it ultimately divorced the state from the church entirely.  This “aggressive secularism” 
built on a set of atheistic or agnostic philosophical presuppositions:  atheism (or Deism--in either 
case for which God is considered irrelevant to modern history), naturalism (the presupposition 
that the natural realm constitutes the whole of the universe), and materialism (the philosophy that 
holds to the existence of a physical, material explanation for all phenomena, including that which 
appears to be immaterial).  Adherents of this view developed a materialistic restatement of the 
Protestant view of progress, based instead on a humanistic belief in the inevitability of progress, 
whether social, economic, or political, a view that made room for nihilistic views of conflict and 
progress. 
 This “secularism in the bad sense” is characterized by three beliefs: 
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1) religion is a discrete, sui generis phenomenon;  
2) religion is not self-critical or open to critique and exchange (because, it is held, 
religion is radically subjective or based on dogmatic authority or on both); and therefore  
3) religious citizens can and should accept the privatization of religion, that is, they 
should keep their religion out of politics. These three positions presuppose a narrow, 
parochial view of religion....37 
 
 This model of aggressive secularism moved beyond notions of privatizing religion “for 
the sake of a pact of nonaggression” to a view that “religion is a destructive, superstitious relic of 
the past that has no place in modernity.”  It holds tightly to the secularization hypothesis (despite 
evidence to the contrary) in the belief that in the modern age, humans are “enlightened and freed 
from the shackles of religion.”  The assertion is clear:  “Secularism is the essence of modernity 
and religion is the antithesis of all that is modern.”38  Cladis called it “the ugly sense of 
secularism.”39 
 The extent to which either of these models affected the American and French Revolutions 
will become apparent in the next two sections.  What is already clear is that this is not merely a 
comparison of the religious and the secular.  Rather, because there are at least two overarching 
models of what constitutes a secular regime,40 this is a comparison of those two divergent 
models. 
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CHAPTER 2 - The Ideology Behind the American Revolution 
 
 The ideology behind the American Revolution has been a contentious topic for many 
years, especially with respect to the Bible’s influence.  Some see it as a completely secular 
endeavor, while others see it as the product of Divine Providence.  For example, James S. 
Valliant, an author who proposes Roman emperors “invented” Christianity, asserts: “The 
Founders were men of the Enlightenment,” the “defining characteristic” for which “was man's 
application of reason to every concern.”1  He sees in the Enlightenment a clear sequence of 
thought from 1) Aquinas’s reintroduction of Aristotle “into a world dominated by unadulterated 
Christianity for more than a millennia [sic]” (the “era of the Scholastics”), to 2) the Renaissance, 
(“the Rebirth of Reason”), and finally to 3) the Enlightenment.2  Notably, he appears to discount 
any influence on the Enlightenment from the intervening historical event:  the Reformation.  
After claiming the American Revolution was a product of the Enlightenment, he continues, “The 
advancements of the Enlightenment were driven not by faith-based theology but by observation-
based rationality.”3  Alex McCrossen, professor of history at Southern Methodist University, 
notes that a 1967 “classic” text by Bernard Bailyn on the Revolution contains “many references 
to Rome, a couple to Greece, and none to the Old or New Testament.”4  According to 
McCrossen, in the years to follow the publication of Bailyn’s text, historians tended to focus on 
“how familiarity with ancient history and the classics informed American political and artistic 
culture.”5   
                                               
1 J.S. Valliant, “The New Testament versus the American Revolution,” The Objective Standard, 10, no. 2, 
(Summer 2015):  36, accessed August 7, 2016,  http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048. 
2 Ibid., 37. 
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This is not to say that such scholars successfully demonstrated the complete absence of 
biblical influence on the American Revolution.  Even Valliant, who claims the Revolution “was 
driven not by faith and self-sacrifice but by reason and self-interest” concedes: “Of course, many 
of the Founders were not Christians but rather were deists. Even these Founders, however, were 
influenced substantially by aspects of Christian thought.”6  Other scholars like McCrossen have 
completely departed from Bailyn’s model of secular origins and assert, for example, “how 
profoundly the Old Testament influenced political debate and reflection in the United States 
between the Revolution and the 1830s.”7  He notes that prominent early American figures like 
Lyman Beecher “believed that the American Constitution came from the Bible, not Rome or 
Greece.”8 
 
Biblical Influence 
What is more certain than the Bible’s direct influence on the Revolution is its profound 
influence on the colonial culture of the time.  Assertions range from descriptions of the American 
colonies as a “biblically literate society”9 to noting the Bible was “omnipresent” in the 
“presecularized” colonies in the years before the Revolution.10  One leading church historian, Dr. 
Mark Noll, went so far as to identify the Bible as “the nation's vade mecum in times of crisis,”11 
and McCrossen quotes historian Eran Shalev, who notes that during and after the Revolution, 
people’s understanding of the Bible “placed the United States in a biblical time frame,” and 
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“conditioned contemporaries to think of an American mission in biblical terms.”12  In fact, even 
the argument that “the prominence of the Bible in the lives of Americans began to decline in the 
first half of the nineteenth century,”13 is evidence of the Bible's significance during the 
revolutionary century that preceded it. 
Another well-documented fact is that many revolutionaries appealed to the Bible to 
support, defend, and motivate the Revolution.  James P. Byrd, who contradicts Bailyn’s secular 
position, observes “the Bible was a major source of rhetoric supporting the American 
Revolution.”14  While the American Revolution may not have been a “religious revolt,” he notes, 
“the Bible was a central channel for inspiring revolutionary sentiments.”15  In 1966, the year 
before the publication of Bailyn’s text, scholars like the late Professor Alan Heimert of Harvard 
“controversially depicted evangelical religion as a major factor in the coming of the American 
Revolution.”16  Even critics of the Revolution made similar observations.  Loyalist Peter Oliver 
wrote in the eighteenth century of how the “dissenting clergy” played a prominent role in the 
rebellion against British authority.17 
James Byrd’s contribution to scholarship on the subject has been remarkable.  He studied 
543 sermons or pamphlets that included 17,148 biblical citations18 over a period from 1764 to 
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180019 to analyze how the clergy found justification, moral support, and even imperatives in the 
Bible.  He concluded, “Ministers played a critical role in providing religious motivation for 
soldiers, officers, and even civilians as they embraced the war with Britain,” helping them 
“overcome both fear and moral scruples.”20  He notes, “Killing for the cause of American 
independence was…not presumed to have unconditional divine support.”21  Ergo, people 
searched the Scripture for guidance. 
One mitigating factor to the claim for biblical inspiration to the Revolution is that, while 
research clearly indicates eighteenth-century sermons were replete with biblical support for the 
revolution, it is not as clear what impact those sermons had or how well they were received.22  It 
is more difficult to establish how “Bible-based rhetoric” from the clergy affected “individual 
belief and action” among the laity.23  Whether the Bible was more a tool than a source is also not 
clear.  Some argue that the Bible was not so much the original inspiration for the Revolution, 
because “commitment to one political side or another came first, and biblical justifications for 
that commitment came later.”24   
Such controversies find expression in varying interpretations of biblical imperatives.  
Revolutionaries, for example, “struggled with loyalist claims that Peter and Paul condemned 
rebellion against civil authority….”25  Their solution was that they “read the apostles through a 
republican prism.”26  Alexis McCrossen is another scholar who “redresses the scholarly neglect 
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of the role of the Old Testament ‘in the formation and evolution of an American republican 
worldview’” by drawing attention to this “prism,” which he defines as “biblical 
republicanism.”27  Likewise, Byrd notes what he calls “Hebraic republicanism” in Revolutionary 
War sermons and notes that Thomas Paine, in his Common Sense, used the Bible “as a historical 
document supporting arguments against monarchy.”28  Byrd even notes that with otherwise 
awkward passages like Romans 13, where Paul clearly advocates respect for government, pro-
Revolution ministers were able to argue “the verses did not apply to tyrants who violated 
preexisting laws, which were the real powers that be.”29  McCrossen asserts that the 
revolutionaries saw in the Bible, especially the Old Testament, “a narrative of resistance to 
tyranny,” which “gave them a language and discourse through which they could talk about 
tyranny and republican virtue.”30  Ironically, because of this analysis, the same passage that 
advocated respect for authorities became a source of security after the revolution, serving as “a 
biblical safeguard against unbridled liberty and radical republicanism.”31 
Some, on the other hand, see even clearer theological sources for the revolutionaries’ 
arguments.  Byrd, for example, asserts that Roger Sherman, one of the “forgotten founders” who 
was instrumental in drafting both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, based 
his political theory on his Reformed theology.  He places more weight on “Reformed Protestant 
arguments for resistance” than on the more common (and more secular) “Lockean” founding.32  
Professor Glenn Moots of Princeton and Northwood University notes, however, that there is 
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“very little of a paper trail between Reformed theology and Sherman himself,” making it difficult 
to determine whether “natural rights, limited government by consent, and the right of resistance 
necessarily owed to Reformed Protestant theology [emphasis original].”33  Even “Lockean” 
origins do not demonstrate any lack of biblical foundation, however.  At the very least, these 
alternative claims suggest that American political theory derives from both Sherman's Reformed 
theology and Richard Hooker's Anglican theology filtered through Locke's secular perspective (a 
point that will be demonstrated below). 
What is clear is that the society at large felt it important to draw upon the Bible for 
justification and inspiration.  Based on Byrd’s analysis and the density of biblical citations in the 
sermons and writings, it is easy to see that “Americans of the revolutionary era were, clearly, 
deeply immersed in scripture,”34 and biblical support appears to be the best explanation for “the 
surge of popular opinion in colonial conventions during the spring of 1776.”35 
 
Deists and Critical Scholarship 
 Another point of contention over biblical influence on the Revolution stems from the 
advent of critical biblical scholarship at the time.  This objection appears to stem from an “all or 
nothing” approach to philosophical influence.  If revolutionaries may not have believed the Bible 
completely, how can it have played a role in the Revolution?  Indeed, some revolutionaries did 
hold heterodox beliefs.  As naturalist philosophers came to conflate biblical faith with the 
irrational, “philosophers like Locke and other English Deists” made a concerted effort to “prune 
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away what is irrational” from the Bible.36  Since adherence to Christianity was fashionable and 
expected, deists tended to lead a double life, “moving in respectable circles and seemingly 
conventional in their religious views, but privately collecting heterodox publications.”37  The 
works they quietly produced “focus on the sayings of Jesus, providing a vivid image of a 
moralist and teacher…omit[ting] practically all of the miraculous events narrated in the 
gospels.”38  Their beliefs included the idea that Jesus “was a mere man who taught great moral 
truths,” with a corresponding “aversion to orthodox doctrines such as the Trinity and the 
atonement.”39  A good example is Thomas Jefferson.  In 1820, he “snipped verses from the first 
four gospels, rearranged these in a new order, and pasted the clippings into blank sheets, forming 
an improved version of the New Testament to his liking.”40 
 Jefferson is representative of a subset of the revolutionaries who straddled Christian and 
naturalist philosophies.  Jefferson found morality not in organized religion, but rather in 
“obeying the moral sense implanted by God” that focused on “social utility.”41  “Above all, 
follow your reason,” he is noted for saying, “because nothing true in religion could be contrary to 
it.”42  Apart from a few private communications, Jefferson “remained publicly silent about his 
religious sentiments.”43  Lynn Zastoupil, professor of history at Rhodes College in Tennessee, 
notes, while observing the clear influences of Unitarianism on Jefferson, that because of his 
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efforts to reconstruct the Bible on naturalist terms, Jefferson was able to embrace a Christian 
identity he otherwise found impossible to adopt.44 
 John Locke and Isaac Newton also appear to fit this model.  While it is not clear to what 
extent either of them adopted any particular unorthodox doctrines, they did leave documented 
evidence that they at least gave them consideration.45  What is noteworthy here is that, while 
such people may have lived outside of a completely biblical set of beliefs, they still demonstrated 
the Bible’s influence on their own beliefs.  For example, in 1803, after the Revolution, 
“President Jefferson compiled a syllabus comparing the ethical doctrines of several ancient 
philosophers, the Jews, and Jesus” that he sent only to “a few friends and family members,” and 
declared Jesus’s moral system to be “the most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by 
man.”46 
 
The Bible and Social Contract Theory 
 One less frequently explored means of biblical influence on the Revolution is the 
development of Social Contract Theory.  The Reformation’s theological emphasis on individual 
moral autonomy before God spilled over into political theory.  In this way, Christian ideas 
introduced a “revolution” into political philosophy, specifically the “ethical components of 
contractarianism,” which included “autonomy, responsibility, duty, authorization, and willing.”47  
As a result, “consent or agreement based on will, understood as a moral ‘faculty,’ came to 
occupy a place in…political philosophy which it had never occupied before.”48  This shift was 
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clear in the Declaration of Independence, which asserts “governments derive their 'just powers' 
from the consent of the governed.”49  The American Revolution ushered in the age of “Social 
Contract Theory,” whereby “political legitimacy, political authority, and political obligations are 
derivative from the consent of those who create a government.”50  In the century that followed, 
“consent emerged as the leading doctrine of political legitimacy.”51  In short, the idea of the 
“good” state gave way to the idea of the “legitimate” state.52  As someone else put it, “We have 
in the modern state a new kind of collective agency,” where “the notion of popular will plays a 
crucial role in the legitimating idea.”53  The modern state faces and addresses questions “for 
which there are no analogues in most premodern forms:  what/whom is this state for?  whose 
freedom?  whose expression?”54 
 The idea that Social Contract Theory derives from Christian thought is not without 
controversy, but according to Patrick Riley, while some attribute its development to the 
postmodern focus on will (voluntarism), it is more accurate to acknowledge that even 
voluntarism arose from Christian roots.  “The freedom to conform voluntarily to absolute 
standards had always been important in Christian doctrine.”  Further, he claims: 
[T]he Reformation doubtless strengthened the element of individual choice and 
responsibility in moral thinking, while subordinating the role of moral authority. And it 
was natural enough that the Protestant view of individual moral autonomy should spill 
over from theology and moral philosophy into politics, forming the intellectual basis of 
contract theory.55 
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Biblical Morality or Moral Rationalism? 
 Another point of contention is whether American political theory derives from biblical 
anthropology and morality or rather from naturalism and moral rationalism.  Again, Jefferson is 
the typical case in question.  He was attracted both to moral rationalism--which, according to 
John Locke, “held that political conclusions can be inferred from self-evident premises”--and 
Scottish moral sense philosophy, which held that we sense and feel--not infer--moral values.56  
These are the ideas from which philosophers derived natural law, an ambiguous concept to 
modern ears.  In his review of Morton White’s Philosophy of the American Revolution, J.R. Pole 
provides a helpful definition: 
Natural law differs from physical law because the decision to be bound by natural law 
involves free choice. A fire cannot choose not to burn; but a man can choose not to do his 
duty, just as he may choose not to exercise his right. A man may even choose not to be 
guided by the evidence of his senses:  but no one else can make that choice for him 
because no one can experience the evidence of another's senses. That is why natural 
rights cannot be alienated, that is, voluntarily made over for another to exercise or to 
refrain from exercising.57 
 
 The source of natural law is the question, and the term leaves room for readers to assume 
either Divine or natural origins.  There is little doubt of Locke’s influence on Jefferson’s view of 
morality and natural law.  While conventional wisdom holds that Jefferson most likely read 
Locke's Second Treatise before the Declaration of Independence, some contest this.  Even so, the 
late Harvard Professor Morton White contends in his pivotal work, The Philosophy of the 
American Revolution, that Jefferson's language--self-evident truths, inalienable rights, laws of 
nature, and man's essence, for example--betrays a heavy influence by the writings of Swiss jurist 
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Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, “one of the more effective transmitters of Locke's ideas.”58  As a 
result, Jefferson's ideas appeared to have been a “Burlamaquian” blend of Locke's moral 
rationalism and Scottish moral sense philosophy.59 
 What is apparent, then, is a combination of biblical and naturalistic origins--from which 
Jefferson and others borrowed--for the morality of the Declaration of Independence.  In both 
moral sense philosophy and Lockean moral rationalism, a fine line exists between individual 
moral autonomy under God and a more subjective, humanist view.  For some, the “moral sense” 
exists because God writes the law on human hearts; for others, it is merely “natural.”  What’s 
more, even John Locke relied heavily on Richard Hooker’s (an Anglican priest) theological 
writings as the basis for his own philosophy,60 which was really a secular restatement of them.  
For example, it was from Hooker that Locke found the “postulation of human equality as the 
foundation of the reciprocal duties humans owe one another.”61  What is notable, then, is that the 
Declaration of Independence employs both moral rationalism in its assertion that truths are “self-
evident,” and a biblical view by citing that men are “endowed by their Creator” with certain 
rights. 
 These foundations led to a unique expression of “qualified egalitarianism,” especially for 
Jefferson.  While some scholars argue that “the central impulses of the [American Revolution] 
were highly egalitarian,”62 Morton White argues that for Jefferson, “the power to see self-
evidence was attributed to a specific group and not to every person.”63  This specific group of 
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people “had much leisure [and] improved understandings” and were better able to discern “self-
evident” moral truths.64  White even asserts Jefferson subscribed to Aristotle's notion that “some 
men were slaves by nature” and questioned whether they “possessed enough rational power to 
warrant inclusion in the species man.”65 
Locke, too, had “identified several classes of people who could not or would not perceive 
the self-evident...,” and so “...the thinking of Jefferson and his contemporaries developed within 
a derived system in which some truths were more self-evident than others, depending on the 
propensities of the minds to which they were presented….”66  Based on this view, “the people” 
for Jefferson “are those, and only those, who have the capacity or will to grasp the truths of 
natural law.”67  This is why Jefferson sought something analogous to (but not identical to) 
“property qualifications for voters.”68  The dark side of such assertions is obvious.  In a broader 
sense, however, “a faith in all the people was not one of the philosophical ideas advocated in the 
[American] Revolutionary era.”69  However, this is not to say that Jefferson felt some people 
would remain forever disenfranchised based on capability:  “Jefferson's optimism gave him hope 
for the educability of the people, in contrast to Locke's characteristic pessimism.”70 
Burlamaqui’s influence on Jefferson also found expression in his influence on the rights 
asserted in the Declaration of Independence.  On the one hand, a more overtly biblical source for 
those rights seems apparent, because based on Burlamaqui’s influence, Jefferson believed it was 
“undeniable (but not self-evident) that the right to preserve life, to preserve liberty, and to pursue 
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happiness, were derived from the self-evident truth of equal creation.”71  On the other hand, 
Burlamaqui’s influence explains why Jefferson replaced Locke’s right to property with the 
pursuit of happiness: 
Jefferson…distinguished between inalienable rights, which came directly from God and 
included life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and adventitious rights, which, like 
property, derived from man's own actions and were therefore renounceable. Because 
man's duty to God required him to preserve-by rebellion, if necessary-only the former, it 
was obviously inappropriate to include an adventitious right such as property.72 
 
This difference in the “trilogy of rights” is a significant one between the American and French 
Revolutions. 
 The American Revolution, then, derived from a combination of biblical and naturalistic 
philosophy and found much moral support and justification in the Bible.  The American 
implementation of “civic religion”--or at least of what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called a strong 
“philosophy of civility,” promoting the three norms of “1) human rights, 2) equality and 
nondiscrimination, and 3) democracy”73--was “clearly part of God’s providential plan for 
mankind,”74 as seen in the assertion, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal….”  As Bauberot put it, “In…the United States…, religion contributed in various 
ways to secularization and particularly to the development of a democratic sociability.”75 
 
Open Marketplace of Religion 
 
 Whether one points more to moral sense or moral rationalism, Jefferson's and Madison's 
rejection of all forms of religious intolerance follows logically from these positions.  “The 
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evidence of religion which is present to my senses cannot be directly known to yours, and I 
cannot receive from another person any evidence which is not directly known to me.”76  The 
“secularism” of the United States’ (U.S.) Constitution, in contrast to French revolutionary 
secularism, sought merely to prohibit established churches.  The result, rather than suppression 
of faith, was to create what some called a “sort of marketplace of religions.”77  An ironic result is 
that the American separation of church and state “has been conducive to high levels of religious 
belief and participation.”78  The goal of American “state neutrality” has been “to avoid favoring 
or disfavoring not just religious positions, but any basic position, religious or nonreligious.”79  
Indeed, Marx's later condemnation of American society was telling.  American society had not 
achieved true secularism, in his opinion. As Emmet Kennedy, Professor of History at the 
Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, summarized Marx, “The separation of church and state 
in the United States,” he opined, “atheized the state, but not civil society, which was still 
religious….”80 
 In the decades following the Revolution, the Bible profoundly impacted American 
society, including the government.  By the 1830s, the word “secularism” had not entered into 
American public life (unlike France, where laïcité became a battle cry).  Separation of church 
and state at the time left a role for religion in public life that is much more controversial today.  
In the 1830s, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story allowed for one “to invoke the principles of 
Christianity in interpreting the law,” because the point of the separation clause was merely “to 
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exclude all rivalry among Christian sects,” since virtually all religion in America was Christian.81  
Indeed, in 1892, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the U.S. to be a “Christian nation.”82 
 Still, potential tensions within this system were likely from the outset.  The First 
Amendment embodies two goals:  the first is the rejection of establishment; the second is the 
guarantee of “free exercise.”  As a result, “It is not inconceivable that these should conflict.”83  
Any final solution to dilemmas that may arise from the tension between secular “state neutrality” 
and religious expression still eludes Americans for, after all, a “really diverse democracy can't 
revert to a civil religion, or antireligion…without betraying its own principles.”84  At best, we 
can remain in an “overlapping consensus.”85 
 As we will see in the next chapter, the French model, especially during the First 
Republic, was very different, a “non- or even antireligious ideology,”86 sometimes described as a 
“militant laïcité.”87 
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CHAPTER 3 - The Ideology behind the French Revolution 
 
 In 1789, King Louis XVI convened the Estates General, which set off a chain of events 
that came to a head on 21 September 1792, when the National Convention officially abolished 
the French monarchy and first declared France a free republic.1  Because the French Revolution 
followed quickly on the heels of the American Revolution, the two events are often compared as 
if they stemmed from similar ideologies.  The differences, however, are much greater than the 
similarities.  The American Revolution, for instance, was a mere “secession” from England.  The 
French Revolution, on the other hand, was a true insurgent rebellion that led to a complete power 
change (several, in fact).  What is more, in the American Revolution, the Constitution, once 
written, was never to be replaced, “unlike the repeated French efforts to establish a desirable and 
lasting version,” and the king, once rejected, was never to be replaced by another.2 
 What caused the French Revolution is the subject of hot debate:  “At present, no 
comprehensive explanation for the coming of the Revolution exists…[and] it is unlikely that one 
will emerge.”3  This thesis, however, is not a quest to explain the origins of the Revolution, but 
instead, to explore the worldview(s) the revolutionaries embraced.   
  
Top-Down, not Bottom-Up 
Origins of the Revolution are therefore of concern only insofar as they demonstrate 
ideology.  According to Gail Bossenga, Professor of History at the College of William and Mary, 
Tocqueville first described the Revolution in more structural terms as “the culmination of the 
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process of centralization.”4 After 1) Tocqueville's more “traditional” description, scholarly 
descriptions of its causes moved from 2) Marxist apologetics (that oversimplified it as a clash 
between classes in accordance with the Marxist model), to 3) various forms of revisionism 
(which sought more complex structural explanations, focusing on financial and ideological 
“discourses” and contexts during the Revolution's various phases, and focusing more recently on 
“political culture,” as expressed in symbols, rituals, and media).5  While any or all of these 
explanations are telling in terms of ideology, they are also prone to certain dangers.  Marxist 
explanations were given to “economic determinism,” while revisionist explanations have often 
given way to “ideological determinism,”6 an excess the author of this thesis seeks to avoid.  The 
“radical” historians (apologists for Marxism) who displaced “conservative” explanations during 
the twentieth century until the 1980s, explained it in Marxist terms as an “inexorable march of 
distinct aristocratic, bourgeois, peasant, and proletarian phases.”7  Later critiques of Marxist 
explanations are revealing.  While Marxism would have predicted a “bottom-up” revolutionary 
progression in France from feudalism to capitalism (before progressing inevitably to socialism 
and communism), others note that this did not happen.  Instead, “contrary to radical orthodoxy, 
the French Revolution likely retarded rather than advanced the progress of capitalism,” and 
peasants “clung stubbornly to the old communal mode of organization.”8  As such, it was much 
more of a “top-down” revolution than Marxism expects.  Some describe it instead as “essentially 
a political revolution with social consequences and not a social revolution with political 
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consequences,” or alternatively--for those who prefer social over political explanations--a “social 
revolution from above”9 more akin to the later Stalinist model.10 
The “top-down” nature of the French Revolution may be partly explained by the 
influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  As Professor Hugh Ragsdale of the University of Alabama 
wrote of Rousseau’s influence, “Everything depended fundamentally on politics, and . . . no 
people could ever be anything but what the nature of its government made it.”11  Because 
Rousseau saw politics, instead of religion or custom, as the basis for society, “the character of a 
people depended on the nature of its government….”12  As a result, “in ways that Rousseau 
prophesied but could himself only dimly imagine, government became an instrument for 
fashioning a people.”13 This component of Rousseau’s expression in the French Revolution, 
Ragsdale suggests, is “a hint of Stalin’s Second Revolution, Russia’s Iron Age.”14 
Since the French Revolution was arguably more top-down than bottom-up, it is 
appropriate to notice the nature of the monarchy involved.  The French monarchy’s demise 
stemmed from numerous, converging forces:  financial strains, political rivalries, parliamentary 
opposition, and attacks on royal legitimacy stemming from evolving political theory.15  One clear 
contrast with the American Revolution is that while the British monarchy had been ceding a 
growing measure of power to the nobles (and later to Parliament) for centuries, the French 
political system leading up to the Revolution still “rested…heavily on the king's personal 
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sovereignty.”16  Even those who note limitations on royal power in France still used descriptive 
terms like “patrimonial state” because of the king's heavy influence.17   
Indeed, the more absolute nature of royal authority in France created tremendous 
financial strain.  “Participation in the War of American Independence…had left the [French] 
government heavily endebted [sic] and more dependent on the parlement of Paris to rubber-
stamp new taxes and loans.”18  Unlike England, however, where “the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 had transformed the British government into a trustworthy or ‘credible’ borrower”19 
(because the British Parliament had taken fiscal control), in France “absolute monarchs could 
repudiate debt,”20 which meant French borrowing came at a much higher price.  One outcome of 
this was that the French credit system failed in 1788, setting off a chain of events that led to the 
Revolution.21 
 
French Laïcité -- “Militant” Secularism 
 One of the most profound contrasts between the French Revolution and the American 
Revolution is the former’s potent form of secularism.  As Bauberot put it, “The French speak 
willingly of the ‘French exception,’ and it is true that the French system of secularism has 
peculiar or unique traits.”22  In France, secularism (laïcité) is “not simply…a policy choice 
but…part of its national identity.”23  Craig Caolhoun, sociologist and president of the Berggruen 
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Institute, defines it uniquely as a “Catholaïcité,”24 which, like French identity, has been shaped 
“not just by general Christian history but by Catholic culture, its struggle against and ascendancy 
over Protestantism, and then the challenge brought by revolutionary and republican assertions of 
the primacy of citizenship over devotion.”25 
 In order to understand how a strange moniker like Catholaïcité could evolve, a look at 
France’s religious history is important.   
 
Historic Repression of the Bible 
 French history reveals a consistent pattern of Catholic repression of alternative Christian 
expressions.  In the 13th and 14th centuries, not long after the zenith of Roman Catholic power, 
Pope Innocent III launched the Albigensian Crusade against a religious movement named for the 
region of Albie in France.  While the Catholic Church accused them of heresy, any true evidence 
of their doctrines is lost to history: 
It is exceedingly difficult to form any very precise idea of the Albigensian doctrines 
because present knowledge of them is derived from their opponents and from the very 
rare and uninformative Albigensian texts which have come down to us. What is certain is 
that, above all, they formed an antisacerdotal party in permanent opposition to the Roman 
church and raised a continued protest against the corruption of the clergy of their time.26 
 
That their survivors joined the Waldensians, a Bible-believing movement, suggests the 
Albigensians may also have followed a biblical doctrine.  The first major battle of the 
Albigensian Crusade was the Massacre at Béziers, 21-22 July 1209, where as many as 20,000 
civilians were slaughtered.27 
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 The Huguenots were a largely Calvinist movement that derived from the Reformation.  
They “generally read the Bible…as authoritative testimony…that is, as history with theological 
implications.”28  On 24-25 August, 1572, Roman Catholic nobles and other citizens murdered 
between 5,000 and 30,000 Huguenots in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.  By the late 17th 
century, hundreds of thousands more had fled from persecution in France.29 
 A third noteworthy movement that took place mostly in France, Jansenism, stressed 
original sin and the grace of Christ, opposing Jesuit assertions in their Counter-Reformation.30  
Others describe them merely in structural terms, as “a dissident movement in the Catholic 
Church.”31  Pope Clement IX officially ended toleration of the movement in 1713,32 however, 
and Louis XIV outlawed them sometime before the Revolution during Louis XVI’s reign.33 
 What becomes clear as a result is that the Roman Catholic Church largely wiped out any 
traces of the Reformation in France during the centuries leading up to the Revolution.  In pre-
revolutionary France, then, “Catholicism was the lens through which all religion was viewed at 
the time.”34 
 
Biblical Criticism in France 
 One apparent side-effect of the Catholic Church’s repression of the Reformation in 
France (and with it, repression of open use of the Bible) is that biblical criticism gained 
                                               
28 Schwarzbach, “Reason and the Bible in the So-Called Age of Reason,” 437.    
29 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., https://www.britannica.com/topic/Albigenses, accessed Sept 29, 2017. 
30 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Jansenism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc., https://www.britannica.com/topic/Albigenses, accessed Sept 29, 2017. 
31 Bossenga, “Origins of the French Revolution,” 1302. 
32 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Jansenism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc., https://www.britannica.com/topic/Albigenses, accessed Sept 29, 2017. 
33 Bossenga, “Origins of the French Revolution,” 1302. 
34 Bauberot, "Secularism and French Religious Liberty,” 460. 
38 
 
 
considerably more traction there.  One of Voltaire's (1694-1778) contributions to history was a 
deeply critical reading of the Bible, which “dissolved” its ethical and religious teachings in 
“speculations about the editing and transmission of biblical texts….”35  Another notable 
contributor was Mme du Châtelet (1706-1749), who wrote of her opinion that the Bible was “a 
very fallible manual.”36  Voltaire's and Mme du Châtelet's appraisal of the Bible derived from the 
value they placed on “reason” and “rationality,” hallmarks of Enlightenment thought (the “Age 
of Reason”) that are surprisingly difficult to define consistently.37  While other great 
Enlightenment thinkers like Newton and Descartes revered the Bible, apologetics, and theology 
on the one hand, and studies such as mathematics and the natural sciences on the other, they 
neither read the Bible critically nor applied scientific philosophy to the Bible.  They saw the 
natural and mathematical sciences as deriving from God's creative mind.38  Voltaire and Mme du 
Châtelet, on the other hand, reversed this approach, seeing God and theology as deriving from 
the human mind.39 
One way of describing this is to say that science--a product of Reformation thought in 
minds like Newton's and Descartes', gained independence from the Bible.  Science and the 
philosophy of reason, therefore “correlated,” with “corrosive ramifications for the role of the 
Bible....”40  Biblical interpretation “could no longer tolerate conflicts with natural science.”41  
“For Voltaire [and Mme du Châtelet], science represented rational inquiry, while the Bible 
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represented arbitrary and irrational authority.”42  In essence, they launched what Bertram Eugene 
Schwarzbach, a scholar of their collective works, described as “the warfare of Science with 
theology,”43 or a “war against the Bible.”44  
French Enlightenment thought on faith and reason contrasted sharply with Colonial 
American thought.  Even Jefferson found much value in biblical morality, but in France, biblical 
criticism led to a more wholesale rejection of Scripture.  Voltaire, for example, embraced 
Tertullian’s definition of faith, that “to have faith one must ‘annihilate’ one’s reason, because 
faith and reason are antonymic.”45  In keeping with his contemporary, David Hume, Voltaire 
held reason in such high esteem that “what is reasonable-without contradiction…is believable 
even when it is not true.”46  They not only held the category of “reasonable” to be absolute--not 
subject to any relative judgments (i.e., what is more or less reasonable)--but they also did not 
recognize the subjective application of reason in any person’s mind.  For Mme du Châtelet, “the 
category of reason admits of no qualifications,” and she asserted she “could not reason about 
anything unreasonable.”47  In fact, they rejected resurrections and miracles as “unreasonable,” 
“irrational,” or “absurd.”48  
An extension of this that had clear, ideological implications is that Voltaire and 
Montesquieu both embraced the idea of “noble savages,” people who were “unencumbered by 
Christian dogma” who were “every bit as good as their baptized, European counterparts whom 
they were meant to embarrass. The secularist implications [were] obvious.  What is the need for 
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Revelation if better results could be obtained without it?”49  Unlike even the more skeptical of 
America’s revolutionaries (such as Jefferson), Voltaire and his devotees saw fit to seek morality 
apart from the Bible. 
It may be difficult to measure the impact these ideas had on French public opinion of the 
time, but Schwarzbach asserts that based on a “rough sense of the scale of readership” inferred 
from editions and re-editions of Voltaire’s work, one may infer “quite a few readers in France for 
the most vigorous if not always the most thoughtful Bible criticism.”50  In any case, “[t]oward 
the end of the [18th] century...the battle against the Bible had been largely won by Mme du 
Chatelet and her fellow critics.”51 
 
Anticlericalism 
 
 In the years leading up to the Revolution, then, not only was there minimal influence 
from the Bible in French society, but the Catholic religion “was the only one that was legitimate 
in the old regime.”52  Moreover, the nearly absolute power of the monarchy “was closely tied up 
with religious claims to authority,”53 and French history had seen “a long history of priestly 
involvement in policies, education, and other dimensions of social life.”54  The result was that the 
Revolution “took up the mantle of secularism”55 in a “frontal conflict between what is called 
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‘clericalism,’ or the claim of religion to political dominion over the country, and the 
anticlericalism that actively fought this claim.”56 
 Royal and Catholic persecution of Jansenist priests, which intensified in the 1750s, also 
had an unintended effect.  Jansenists turned to co-religionist jurists for support and succeeded in 
wresting absolute control of the sacraments from the Roman Catholic Church.57  What's more, 
“the [revolutionary] claim that authority inhered in the entire body of the faithful and not in the 
public person of the pope transferred to the political arena” and contributed to the adoption of 
Social Contract Theory.  The revolutionaries’ refusal to “deify the monarch,” something the 
Vatican had done consistently, “helped to ‘desacralize’ the French monarchy” and transfer power 
from the king to the nation's representatives.  The final product of wresting church control from 
the Vatican was “increased control of the state over the church.”58 
 In revolutionary France, then, “laicite came about in a struggle against a powerful 
church” (emphases original).  In fact, the French Revolution “was the first anti-religious 
revolution in Europe.”59  The extent of the backlash was remarkable: 
When the French Revolution detonated, a series of acts between 1789 and 1793 
secularized both the state and the church. Popular sovereignty replaced divine right, 
church property was secularized, religious orders were suppressed, the Civil Constitution 
of the Clergy unilaterally subordinated the church to the state (clergymen were to be 
elected by the secular electorate, and communications with Rome were forbidden).60 
 
Two years later in 1795, a “rather punitive separation of Church and State”61 ensued.   
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This official separation “sanctioned the termination of clerical salaries” and, while it allowed 
churches to reopen, tolerated “no public manifestation of cult.”62  Officially, “Religion was to be 
confined to the private domain where, as one of the Ideologues put it, ‘each citizen can indulge 
in the errors he pleases.’”63  
The French revolutionary goal was for the state to have “a morality independent of all 
religion” and a “moral supremacy” in relation to all religion based on liberty and a “rational 
theology.”64  Therefore, for the French, “laicite was all about controlling and managing 
religion.”  They sought to remove religion “from the spaces of the Republic.”65  The French 
revolutionary ideal was not merely secularism, but a more militant form of irreligion.66  Even the 
Reign of Terror did not sufficiently deter anticlericalism.  It led to religious (Catholic) revival, 
but the official separation of Church and State followed in 1795.67 
 
Ideology as a Replacement for Religion 
 The “rational theology” the revolutionaries sought found expression in “ideology,” or the 
“Science of Man,” which led to today’s social sciences.68  In 1796, three years before the French 
Revolution culminated in the Napoleonic coup, “the physician-philosopher Pierre-Jean-Georges 
Cabanis (1757-1808) exhorted his colleagues of the French National Institute to establish the 
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‘science of man and society.’”69  He and his peers sought to replace traditional religion with 
“ideology,” or the “science of ideas.”  An “ideologue-physician,” he rose to prominence in the 
early years of the Revolution due to the combination of his medical philosophy and his political 
connections.70  His philosophy reflected “a unique confluence of medicine, politics, and 
philosophy in the clear line of thought from the Enlightenment to the French Revolution.”71  
Based on “the Enlightenment philosophy of human perfectibility,”72 they sought to take 
empiricism--Francis Bacon's method of studying the natural world--and apply it to humanity, to 
“integrate man into nature and make him the object of science by the rigorous study of his 
physical-mental qualities.”73  In essence, man became the object not only of scientific study but 
also scientific manipulation, leading to the “exalted mission of human and social regeneration.”74 
 This new “applied science of man” was inconsistent with much of the revolutionary 
impulse.  This stemmed from a tendency towards determinism.  Their attempt to produce an 
“autonomous science of human behavior” led to “psychophysical engineering,” by assuming 
desirable human behavior could be achieved through “sound psychophysiological habits [that] 
could modify the state of the brain, the nervous system, and the internal organs.”75  With this 
philosophy, physicians joined legislators in a joint endeavor to “perfect the human species,” 
though Cabanis hoped the government's role would be limited.76  An ideological inconsistency 
manifested in the inherent clash between such social manipulation and claims to “liberty.”  The 
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pursuit of the twin goals of perfecting society and perfecting its human members forced 
revolutionaries to seek an elusive “compromise…between freedom and regulation.”77  Another 
inconsistency lay in the inability of their philosophy to explain or motivate the free will 
necessary for any revolutionary endeavor.  Insofar as physiological materialism leads to (or 
derives from) materialistic determinism, it is difficult to explain any line that projects from there 
to political activism, because in doing so, ideologues presuppose “a will free enough to enact 
reform.”78   
Reason as a Replacement for God 
 Following a line of thought from Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet to Canabis, the 
revolutionaries’ solution for the clash between human perfectibility and human liberty appears to 
have been the philosophically elevated notion of reason.   As David Ciavatta of Ryerson 
University in Toronto notes of Hegel’s account of the Revolution: “That to which the revolution 
grants absolute sovereignty, that which it reveals as ultimate, is nothing other than the principle 
of reason itself.  This attempt to let reason alone rule the world is part of what makes the 
revolution so momentous an event…” (emphases mine).79  While Jefferson had seen education as 
desirable for enfranchising people, the French saw it as a means of perfecting them for society.  
Not only that, but some in the Revolution even deified the concept: 
...[T]he French view school as the perfect institution to teach future citizens to exploit 
their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom of thought. The problem is 
that people can cease to view reason itself as a simple instrument, enshrining it instead. 
Indeed, there was a short-lived but authentic cult during the revolution (1793-1794) that 
actually worshipped the “Goddess of Reason.”80 
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 Faith in the absolute nature of reason became a hallmark of the French Revolution.  
“...Revolutionary practice was an attempt to institute the sovereignty of reason...through the 
mediation of the agency of rational individuals, and ultimately through mediation of the 
universal will of reason” (emphases mine).81  It was thought “men’s particular and finite wills,” 
when educated to practice reason, would naturally lead to a clear “general will of all, insofar as 
this will is at bottom rational.”  Herein lay “the law of the general will,”82 a belief in and 
commitment to an “abstract, universal will.”83  The ideal notion of a “totally rationalized 
practical environment” necessarily led to the second ideal notion of a “rational agent who is 
already in possession of all of the universal ‘laws of action’ that are to govern [his or] her every 
move.”84  The only thing necessary for such a “rational agent” was to identify any situation “in 
terms of its transparent, universal character, plug it into [his or] her store of universal maxims, 
and the required action [would] be clear....”85 
 Here lies another apparent inconsistency within the French revolutionary philosophy.  
Such philosophers rejected biblical “irrational” absolutes in the belief they would find an 
alternative set of absolutes--this one completely “rational” and “natural.”  Once this set of 
“timeless principles” were found, no further argument would be required.  The problem was that 
“there is no such set of timeless principles that can be determined …by reason alone.”86 
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From “the Year of Our Lord” to “the Year of the Republic” 
 The day after the National Convention abolished the monarchy and declared a republic,87 
the National Convention passed a resolution “to replace the Gregorian Calendar and its Anno 
Domini dating system with a series of radical calendar reforms.”88  As Emmett Kennedy put it, 
“The cult of Reason of the Terror sought to rid France of Christianity once and for all.”89   Their 
“revolutionary calendar” removed “all holy and saints’ days, substituting civic 
commemorations.”90  Instead, they aimed “to recognize and memorialize” the French Revolution 
“as a radical new beginning, most strikingly by making the revolution itself – instead of Christ’s 
birth – the most foundational orienting point in its dating system.”91  In effect, they asserted the 
French Revolution as more pivotal to human history than the birth of Christ.  The National 
Convention made the start of their revolution “the ultimate reference point from the perspective 
of which the meaning of all human actions and institutions…must from then on be interpreted 
and evaluated.”92 
 This “highly decimalized system” was akin to the metric system, dividing each month 
into three, complete ten-day weeks, each day into ten hours, each hour into one hundred minutes, 
and each minute into one hundred seconds.93  As a more “rational” calendar, it was intended to 
further entrench “revolutionary vigilance against the irrational authority of religious and other 
traditional prejudices.”94 
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 The revolutionary calendar was a clear expression of faith in the absolute nature of reason 
and the unquestionable nature of “universal will.”  A “core function” of the calendar was to 
openly assert, “now that the universal will of the legislature had entered the scene, [that] all other 
authorities, all other claims – whether past or future – to determine the ultimate meaning and 
direction of human affairs, must be resituated on its terms” (emphasis mine).95  In essence, they 
proclaimed “the first day of their radical new narrative of human freedom – was itself willed by 
the rational order of nature itself...” (emphasis mine).96 
 
Rousseau’s “Mandatory” Civil Religion 
 French revolutionaries advocated a civil religion much as American revolutionaries had 
done a few years before.  Unlike the American model, however, which functioned alongside 
traditional religion and even encouraged its practice, the French model--based on Rousseau’s 
writings--sought to supplant traditional religion.  Rousseau wrote in his Social Contract (1762) 
that “Christianity could not serve as the religion for his republic or any other state honoring the 
‘general will,’ because it diverted men's loyalties to another world.”97  The civic religion he 
advocated in place of Christianity “came to life in the Revolution with a panoply of naturalistic 
festivals.”98  For him, “fidelity to the social contract...requires moral education (something like 
civic education)…,”99 which must take the form of his civic religion. 
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 Rousseau’s model is a fascinating contradiction in terms.  He famously charged, “Man is 
born free, and everywhere he is in chains,"100 and he also insisted “on the primacy of liberty,”101 
but what he meant by “free” and “in chains” is not readily apparent.  As Boston University 
Professor of Philosophy Charles L. Griswold put it, “Rousseau’s theory faces deep difficulties—
ultimately about the nature of what it means to be free....”102  First, because Rousseau saw his 
civil religion as indispensable to the implementation of the social contract, “his notion of “civil 
religion” was “non-optional.”103  Equally famous are his assertions that people are “obligated to 
conform their wills to their reason,” and “shall be forced to be free.”104  What's more, “the ‘civil 
profession of faith’ is required by law and backed by the police power of the state.”105  Second, 
in the spirit of Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet, Rousseau appeared to believe his own word on 
civil religion was final, for he was “explicit” that they were to be offered “without explanations 
or commentary.”106  Any reflections or debate over the “dogmas” of his social contract, he 
surmised, would “undermine belief” and were therefore not permissible.107  Third, anyone who 
did not “believe” his dogmas could be banished, and anyone who professed them publicly and 
then “behave[d] as if he did not believe them” was to be executed.108 
 In the end, then, Rousseau insisted on “belief, not just conduct,”109 and despite his 
prohibition of religious intolerance, his scheme was severely restrictive of religious belief and 
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practice.110  For Rousseau, uniformity of belief was a necessary precursor to “freedom.”  As 
Griswold put it, “It is easy to see why such a civil religion, because of internal inconsistencies of 
definition, would come into conflict with its own ‘dogma’ that ‘religious intolerance is not 
tolerated.’”111  In fact, “any [religious] view that claims both to be true and alone to offer 
salvation is inconsistent with Rousseau’s 'civil profession.’”112 
 
Freedom Equals Submission 
 For Rousseau, then, the condition one has gained by undergoing the “remarkable change” 
into the social contract is “civil freedom.”  For one to fully exercise free will in the political 
context, or to participate in the general will, “does indeed depend on a particular transformation 
of the individual will.  Rousseau is explicit that the transition from the state of nature to the 
social contract [is] a kind of spiritual transformation.”113  In fact, “The freedom that is gained in 
the ‘civil state’ or ‘social contract’ [is] the freedom one is ‘forced’ into if one ‘refuses to obey the 
general will.’”114  More succinctly, Rousseau defined freedom as “obedience to the law one has 
prescribed to oneself.”115  The opposite, as far as Rousseau was concerned, was “slavery,” which 
he defined as “impulsion of mere appetite.”116  Liberty was, therefore, a combination of 
“obedience to the law one has prescribed oneself” and mastery of appetites, including the desire 
for self-preservation, “such that one is willing to sacrifice one’s life for the state if necessary.”117  
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Griswold summarized it well:  “In sum, Rousseau’s social contract theory holds that naturally 
equal and free citizens are to mold their private wills to the general will, not to some counterfeit 
of the general will, and that in doing so they are truly free, and certainly at least as free as they 
were before.”118 
 
The Great Lawgiver? 
 Another interesting ambiguity in Rousseau's philosophy is his ascribing a “sanctity” to 
his civil religion by means of invoking the “Great Lawgiver,” which appears to be a linguistic 
attempt to transform God into a naturalistic manifestation of the “general will.”  Whether 
Rousseau intended simply to replace God or rather to appeal to Plato’s philosopher-king (or 
both), Griswold dismissed the idea as a deus ex machina119 and charged that Rousseau gave no 
explanation as to the genesis of this “extraordinary figure.”120  Rousseau even appeared to 
replace the biblical notion of law being written on people’s hearts:  “The ‘great Lawgiver attends 
in secret’ to these,” he said, “and they are inscribed ‘in the hearts of the Citizens.’”121  Such a 
Lawgiver (or legislator), according to Rousseau, must be capable of changing human nature.122 
 
Difficulties Establishing Republicanism 
 Roman Catholic support for the monarchy and suppression of Reformation movements, 
therefore, led to a powerful backlash against not just the monarchy, but religion as a whole.  
This, combined with Rousseau’s mandatory model of civil religion meant royal subjects could 
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expect to exchange an absolute God for an absolute notion of reason, and royal tyranny for a 
uniquely republican tyranny. 
 Ironically, while the push for republicanism and division of power might be expected to 
protect against tyranny, factors unique to the French Revolution prevented this.  For example, a 
royalist known as Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet predicted and tried to avert the Revolution by 
advocating social reform with the National Assembly.  Notably, however, he did not see hope 
outside of the crown.  In an interesting foreshadow to Karl Marx, “Linguet saw society as 
divided between the oppressors--the rich and powerful--and the oppressed, including himself.”123  
He felt the “tradition of Montesquieu,” who advocated for the division of power, was one of 
many “tools of the oppressors.”124  To protect against such oppressors, he believed “absolute 
monarchical power must step in” to guarantee the people's rights.125  Ultimately, he was tried and 
guillotined in 1794 as a “partisan of despotism.”126  While his efforts clearly failed, it seems 
possible from his example that the presence of royalists in the National Assembly may have 
retarded the development of separation and limits of power necessary for a constitutional 
republic to succeed.  This may explain why the Revolution’s answer to monarchism (especially 
during the Terror) looked more like populism than republicanism. 
 In summary, the French Revolution was built on an almost purely Enlightenment base 
with a nearly wholesale rejection of the Bible as an authority.  With a naturalist, materialist base 
that appealed to an “absolute” concept of reason and a hypothetically absolute “general will,” 
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and with the inherent tension between “liberty” and conformity to the “general will,” it was very 
difficult for republican values to bear consistent fruit.  The inherent conflicts are visible in the 
Revolution’s tripartite values of liberty, equality, and fraternity.  In religious terms, liberty meant 
“no one must be forced in the domain of religion,” something akin to “free exercise,”127 but as 
demonstrated above, not just external conformity, but true belief in a standard, dogmatic civil 
religion was mandatory in Rousseau’s model.  Equality suggested no religious (or irreligious) 
outlook could be privileged over another,128 but again, any religion with absolute claims outside 
of the civil religion could not truly be tolerated in such a model.  Finally, while Professor 
Emeritus Charles Taylor of McGill University suggests this could be “stretching the point a 
little,” fraternity in religious terms at least implies all spiritual families must be heard, and there 
should be “harmony and comity” between those of different outlooks to the greatest extent 
possible.129  Once again, however, insofar as Rousseau’s model prevailed, this was impossible.  
As Taylor noted, “these three goals, of course, can conflict.”130 
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CHAPTER 4 - Outcomes of the American Revolution 
 The American Revolution, then, was built on a mixed bag of Reformation and 
Enlightenment thought, and a significant portion of the latter actually appealed to the former for 
inspiration.  Both Christians and Deists appealed to the Bible for inspiration and support.  As a 
result, not only were the outcomes of the American and French revolutions different but 
structurally they were very different events.  In the American colonies, for example, the British 
aristocracy had not secured a great deal of status in terms of rank.  Rather, the elite grew more as 
a meritocracy.  According to Dr. Leonard J. Hochberg’s analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
work, “the American Revolution was not a great social revolution as was the French, but merely 
a political revolution,” in which the American elite (New England “commercial elite” and 
Southern slave-owners) were better able to lead because of having no “secured privileges.”1  As 
this paper will demonstrate further below, this structural difference helped preserve liberty.  
Based on Tocqueville’s observations, Hochberg noted, “whereas the French revolutionaries 
destroy[ed] the aristocracy and ultimately weaken[ed] liberty, the American political elite, after 
the revolution, proceed[ed] to found a government in which liberty would be preserved.”2 
 
America’s “Relative Theological Consensus” 
 Tocqueville further noted a stark contrast between American debates and those in the 
French National Assembly.  He emphasized, “the American Constitutional Convention as a 
‘novelty in the history of society’ because the ‘calm’ negotiations of the delegates took place 
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during a time when even sovereignty had been suspended.”3  Tocqueville also noted American 
“self-interest” was “enlightened” by an “eternal perspective.”  As Hochberg put it, “According to 
Tocqueville, the doctrine ‘self-interest rightly understood’ suggests to Americans that virtuous 
acts are conducive primarily to one’s own happiness, utility or ultimate profit – either in this life 
or ‘to earn the blessings of a future state.’”4  As he put it, “[Americans] show with complacency 
how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist each other, and 
inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the 
State.”5 
 Tocqueville also noted that the American doctrine of what he described as “self-interest 
rightly understood” is not sufficient to produce virtue.  In acknowledging this, he indicated the 
existence of another source of virtue. According to Tocqueville:  “By itself [this doctrine] … 
cannot suffice to make a man virtuous, but it disciplines a number of citizens in habits of 
regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, [and] self-command.”6 
What made such “calm” negotiations possible?  What inspired such “enlightened” and 
even selfless “self-interest”?  Tocqueville alluded to it by noting the eternal perspective in “the 
blessings of a future state,” so one possibility to be explored in the concluding material of this 
paper is the presence of the Bible as a cultural influence.  While France had seen much public 
debate between theism (the Roman Catholic Church) and atheism (spearheaded by Voltaire and 
Mme du Châtelet), in the American colonies, debate revolved instead over theism and deism.  
Because of the prevalence of nominal Christian culture, even those who expressed doubts still 
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wanted to “remain Christian.”7  Moreover, because Christianity was seen as a major source for 
social contract theory, public debates played out very differently in America, seeking variously 
to protect and restrain religion, but not eradicate it: 
In America, the protestant notion of individual moral autonomy led to a culture in which 
‘the idealization of private judgment in religion overwhelmed earlier notions of 
communal authority over theological truths.’  Therefore, public debate centered less on 
theological differences and more on ‘doctrine and practice.’ Also of note was how ‘the 
infidel controversies [between Christianity and Deism] transformed religious and civil 
discourse in early America.’ Christians tended to see deists as ‘subversive threats to a 
moral and patriotic citizenry,’ while deists feared Christian ‘moral reformers’ as possible 
‘portends of tyranny.’8 
 
One irony is that such debates with deism, or what Dr. James S. Kabala refers to as “ambient 
infidelity,”9 effectively expanded the “open marketplace” of religions, and “a sturdy cultural 
boundary [was created] between acceptable and unacceptable religious expression in a largely 
Protestant culture.”10  Since only overt infidelity was considered unacceptable, “virtually any set 
of Christian beliefs or practices could gain the protection of religious liberty, even those that may 
have seemed radical in earlier periods.”11  In essence, “all forms of Christianity were legally and 
morally acceptable, because, at least, they were not infidelity.”   
 
Implications of the Relative Theological Consensus 
 There were two immediate implications of this relative theological consensus.  First, all 
parties sought restraint, for “both Christians and deists desired to police the boundaries of 
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publically acceptable religious speech and conduct.”12  Second, neither Christians nor deists (as 
exemplified by Jefferson) saw humanity in idealistic terms.  After all, as mentioned above, for 
Jefferson a self-evident proposition was not necessarily evident to everyone, but only to those 
“with sufficient intellectual acuity.”13  Therefore, “[w]hatever the admirable features of the 
philosophical ideas advocated in the [American] Revolutionary era might have been, . . . a faith 
in all of the people was not one of them.”14  This is partly in common with the French model, for 
like the French, Jefferson believed people could be enfranchised through educational 
improvement.  What is different (and will be seen in the next chapter) is that Americans did not 
see self-evident propositions as composing an “absolute” body of knowledge that could be 
“absolutely” and homogenously attained through education (what the author of this paper refers 
to as “epistemological positivism gone wild”).  Rather, they expected debate, and lots of it. 
 This played out in a different notion of liberty.  “American liberty, in contrast [to the 
French definition], emphasized the triumph of individual freedom and local government over 
national destiny.”  Recognizing the futility of seeking complete consensus and unanimity, 
Americans “recognized conflict among citizens as inherent in freedom itself.”15  In fact, the 
Bible’s presence in American society helped to restrain liberty in a unique way.  James P Byrd, 
mentioned above in Chapter 2 for having analyzed the frequent use and impact of Scripture in 
the American Revolution, noted that as ministers carefully addressed passages like Romans 13, 
where Paul clearly advocates respect for government, they were able to argue “the verses did not 
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apply to tyrants who violated preexisting laws, which were the real powers that be.”16  Because 
of this analysis, Byrd observed, the same passage became a source of security after the 
revolution and served as “a biblical safeguard against unbridled liberty and radical 
republicanism.”17 
 The relative American theological consensus also played out in a unique understanding of 
human rights and their foundation in God.  Dr. Adam Seligman of Boston University notes “just 
how indebted modern ideas of individual rights are to religious principles.”18  These rights 
“spring not from man but from God and Nature.”19  Put another way, “individual rights in 
America were not derived solely from positive law, but had acquired a transcendent justification 
unique in the modern world.”20  Freedom of conscience in America “draws its legitimacy from a 
set of religious precepts and orientations, decidedly not from the idea of the individual as 
autonomous moral actor.”21 
 While this is not uncontested today, the foundation for rights stemmed from the idea that 
“the individual moral agent is not autonomous but subnomous (that is, under divine 
injunctions).”22  From this extends another stark contrast between the American and French 
models.  In America, there is a clear departure from Hobbes’ Leviathan, whereby the state 
subsumes all individuals.  In its place lies a clear distinction between the state and the individual: 
The American bills of rights do not attempt merely to set forth certain principles for the 
state's organization, but they seek above all to draw the boundary line between state and 
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individual.  According to them the individual is not the possessor of rights through the 
state, but by his own nature he has inalienable and indefeasible rights.23 
 
 Because of the distinction between the state and the individual, and because of the divine 
foundation for human rights, equality was able to coexist with liberty.  Tocqueville's pessimistic 
comparison of the revolutions is revealing.  While he saw a “universal history”24 with 4 stages:  
aristocracy, revolution, democracy, and despotism.25 his model was not quite as deterministic as 
the later Marxian model (from feudalism to democracy, socialism, and communism).  
Nevertheless, it reinforced Tocqueville's belief that progress to democracy would inevitably be 
followed by despotism, even in America.  As Hochberg put it, “he was never entirely able to free 
his thought of the tension between historical events and more deterministic, philosophical modes 
of thought.”26  As Hochberg summarized Tocqueville’s belief, “the American experience 
presents the reader with only a temporary anomaly: the unique joining of liberty with equality in 
the United States will, according to his predictions, inevitably disintegrate with the emergence of 
the new despotism.”27 
What is telling is that he traveled to America specifically to understand why in America, 
unlike post-Revolutionary France, “equality coexisted with liberty.”28  Regardless of his belief in 
the inevitability of despotism, Tocqueville still sought hope in the American model:  “[D]espite 
his own pessimism over the longterm [sic] prospects for the preservation of liberty in the United 
States, he believed the import of American institutions could reverse the trend toward despotic 
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rule in France.”29  He studied America “in order to identify opinions and institutions supportive 
of liberty that could be imported into France.”30  In fact, it was on America that “he rest[ed] all 
his hopes for fending off the age of despotism.”31 
Tocqueville might have found that one of these “institutions supportive of liberty” in 
America was the institutional distribution of power in accordance with Montesquieu’s political 
theory.  As Hochberg put it, “In America, the decentralization of administration and local 
governance permits the citizenry to combine economic self-interest with political 
participation.”32  Again, while Tocqueville was not optimistic about their continued existence, he 
noted that in contrast to post-revolutionary France, Jacksonian America had “vibrant local 
governments, newspapers, and free political associations.”33 
 
Separation of Church and State 
A worthy point of comparison between the American and French revolutions is their 
divergent interpretations of separation of church and state.  There has been great debate over the 
First Amendment, in which the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause often 
conflict.  “[T]he Establishment Clause and…the Free Exercise Clause…have tended to take on 
separate and often conflicting lives in American constitutional law.”34  In American history, 
there has been tension between Jefferson's vision of a “wall of separation between church and 
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state”35 and James Madison's fight for greater freedom of religious conscience.36  Likewise, there 
was tension between states that formally sponsored churches37 (prohibitions on the federal 
government were not applied to the states for some time)38 and prominent figures like Roger 
Williams, founder of Rhode Island, where “everyone’s religious conscience stood on an equal 
basis.”39 
As a result, some scholars like American philosopher Martha Nussbaum are willing to 
claim “Americans, religious ones and non-religious ones alike, have overcome religious 
intolerance…and have created an inclusive society.”40  Indeed, after struggling to assimilate 
growing numbers of Irish Catholics in the 19th century, for example, “the Supreme Court laid 
down an important Constitutional principle [in 1963] that the state could not substantially burden 
someone’s religious practice without demonstrating a compelling state interest.”41  Nussbaum 
goes so far as to assert, “Americans have progressively widened their concept of fairness and 
have extended legal respect to all religious groups.”42  To be sure, “The idea that states should 
accommodate religious practices within a general framework of uniform law is undeniably 
stronger in the United States than in Europe.”43 
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Church, State, and Schools 
Separation of church and state is a prominent doctrine in both America and France, and it 
plays out significantly in both nations’ school systems.  “Both countries view the legal separation 
between church and state not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to the higher goal of 
individual liberty in matters of spirituality and faith.”44  The means employed in each country, 
however, “diverge and even conflict.”45  Even in America, courts have demonstrated their belief 
in the “need to limit the teachers' coercive influence over students' religious views.”46  As stated 
in a Pennsylvania decision, “state education officials have a 'compelling interest in maintaining 
the appearance of religious neutrality in the public school classroom.’”47 
Nevertheless, the American model has generally maintained religious expression as 
equivalent to non-religious expression, even in public school facilities.  Especially with regard to 
groups meeting at school after hours, “the Court has consistently held that religious speech and 
association must be treated the same as nonreligious speech and association.”48  Much of this has 
stemmed not only from the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment but also from the Free 
Speech clause.49  Even when attempts to invoke the Establishment clause have been made, “the 
Court [has] rejected this argument as inconsistent with the students’ free speech rights under the 
Equal Access Act.”50 
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American religious liberty derives largely from the restrictions on the government in the 
First Amendment: “The two religion clauses of the First Amendment implement this 
understanding in compatible ways.  The Establishment Clause serves as the explicit structural 
constraint on the infusion of absolutist religious principles into government” (emphasis mine).51  
It not only prevents an “outright theocracy,” but it also prevents the government from “endorsing 
or implementing through law any one group's religious precepts.”52  The Free Exercise Clause, 
on the other hand, “complements this protection by serving as a check on the coercive use of 
government power to force the political majority's religious views on an unwilling minority. 
Along with the other protections of personal expression [i.e., Free Speech] in the First 
Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause guarantees and protects the existence of a vibrant private 
sector....”53 
Another great distinction of the American system is that “American courts...for the most 
part have ruled that parents' rights trump the government's authority--and perhaps the rights of 
their minor children as well.”54  Even more than student rights, American courts have protected 
“rather the right of parents to have their children immersed in a religious exercise chosen by the 
parents.”55  In the U.S., then, barring clearly illegal or harmful activity, “the government is 
precluded from intervening to protect the child's religious prerogatives from family or 
community influences.”56 
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Secularization in America 
Americans today are sometimes surprised by the overt religiosity of early American 
culture, and they may be equally surprised by what stimulated the decline of that religiosity:  
Public schools in the nineteenth century often opened with a reading from the King James 
Version of the Bible...and used reading texts written by Protestant ministers….  It was the 
arrival of Catholic immigrants and their demand for a separate school system that tipped 
the balance toward reserving state aid only for purportedly secular schools. Separation of 
church and state became the chosen formula for Protestants...to [avoid encouraging] the 
growth and spread of Roman Catholicism...[by denying] tax money to benefit church-run 
schools.57 
 
Indeed, defending the rights of religious minorities was problematic for maintaining a “biblical 
consensus” in society.  It led naturally to the “downplay of the role of religion in public 
institutions.”58 
Americans may have struggled to assimilate the influx of Catholics in the 19th century, 
but it is important to remember “that nineteenth-century Catholicism, as pronounced in Rome, 
was not friendly to democratic republics.  Not everything said against Catholic pronouncements 
was ill-informed prejudice.”59  Indeed, “papal conservatism in the nineteenth century...turned 
Catholicism into an unyielding opponent of liberalism…, nationalism, and secular Constitutional 
principles.”60  Near the end of the 19th century, “Pope Leo XIII, who paid attention to the United 
States as a possibly strong influence upon France, issued an encyclical in 1899 warning Europe 
to resist the attraction of the heresy of ‘americanism.’”61  Still, a mercy in American history is 
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that “Vatican policies in the nineteenth century never came close to posing threats to American 
national identity.”62 
Other forces contributed to the steady decline of religiosity in 19th century America.  Dr. 
Christian Smith, a sociologist at the University of Notre Dame, notes the “intellectually thin 
character” of mainstream Protestantism at the time, a religion that emphasized “populist common 
sense, subjective experience, and mass-based emotional revivalism” and that failed “to develop a 
defensible theological approach to knowledge and society that could withstand the attacks of 
elite challengers….”63  From 1857 until the early 1870s, even the NEA “supported the teaching 
of a ‘common Christianity,’ including devotional Bible reading in all public schools.”64  New 
NEA leadership began to contest this through the 19th century, though, and by the 1890s and 
1900s “the contest was settled.”65 
 Another force behind America’s secularization was a uniquely philosophical approach to 
science.  Scientific practice at the time of the American Revolution followed the methods of 
Francis Bacon.  Baconian science sought “to accumulate facts through refined observation . . . 
taking care not to speculate about what was not actually observable, and to avoid preconceived 
notions.”  Rejecting the idea of hypotheses, “the laws discovered by induction were understood 
teleologically as descriptions of the mediate intervention of the divine in the world.”66  In the 
years to follow, “[a] positivist attack on Baconian science advanced a modern science of society 
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that would provide knowledge for a secular and progressive order.”67  This positivist attack came 
from authors like Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley, with their “gospel of naturalism.”68 
The field of psychology is also revealing of the “intellectually thin” nature of 19th century 
Protestantism: 
This speaks to something particular or peculiar to Americans. Protestantism emphasized 
personal experience – first as the personal surrender of a believer to God. But this 
emphasis ‘changed during the nineteenth century from salvation in a future kingdom to a 
cathartic shedding of emotional burdens in service of the kingdom within.’69  
  
In essence, salvation gave way to “self-realization.”70 
A notable difference between American and French histories is that this trend toward 
secularism came much later in the U.S., and it has yet to gain as much traction as it ever did in 
France. 
 
Economic Growth 
America’s high levels of individual liberty have borne fruit economically.  A study 
published in the Journal of Institutional Economics demonstrated that “movements toward 
higher levels of civil liberty are associated with higher economic growth rates.”71  Their study, 
which focused on economies from 1850 to 2010, showed a “long-run association” between the 
two concepts.72 
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Modern economic growth, as we know it, began in the latter half of the 18th century with 
the changes brought about by the American and French revolutions.73  Before then, economics 
was dominated by the “Malthusian equilibrium,” also known as the “Malthusian trap,” whereby 
“[a]ny output growth led to a corresponding population increase that stifled any positive result in 
the GDP per capita, thus maintaining well-being at a subsistence level.”74  Beginning in the 18th 
century, however, “increases in output were not only greater, but the appropriation of the surplus 
began to be shared by a larger proportion of the population, breaking with the inertia of the 
past.”75  In short, the middle class began to grow economically as a direct result of increased 
enfranchisement out of the revolutions.  The end of the old economic model became known as 
the “Malthusian rupture.”76 
Two forms of liberty have been involved.  The first, “civil liberty,” which one study 
refers to as “negative liberty,” is “the individual right to make decisions within a given vital 
space without interference.”  The second, “positive liberty,” is “the right of each individual to 
choose their representative in a democratic society or to run for election to any public post in the 
community.”77  It is the “negative liberty” where we see the greatest divergence between the two 
nations.  According to the study, the greater the consolidation of civil liberties, the greater the 
consolidation of economic growth and development.78  Those places “most inclined toward 
liberty” also eventually have a “greater accumulation of ideas,” which generates “increasing 
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returns for society,”79 including “growth and greater levels of well-being.”80  Alternatively, “the 
resistance to ideas will bring about losses in productivity in those territories that limit the 
reception of new ideas.”81  In summary, the greater the civil liberties, the greater the economic 
growth.  What’s more, “escaping from the low level of civil liberty leads to more significant 
gains in growth than moving from the medium to the high liberty level.”82 
America’s high levels of civil liberties have led to significant economic growth 
throughout its history, despite occasional setbacks.  While France has had two centuries to adjust 
course economically, the comparative long-term effects of both nations’ revolutionary 
philosophies may be seen in that by 2014, France's GDP, when adjusted for cost (purchasing 
power parity = PPP), and when compared to each individual state in the U.S., ranked lower than 
48 of them.83  At $38,847, it ranked above only Idaho and Mississippi.84  Admittedly, there are 
many other factors contributing to this measure, but based on the cited study, it is still a likely 
indicator of relative strength of civil liberties. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Outcomes of the French Revolution 
The French Revolution played out very differently than its American predecessor.  
British commentary on the French Revolution was scathing.  An early 19th-century article in 
Edinburgh Magazine described post-revolutionary France as “a country where anarchy prevails 
and despotism is predominant; where cruelty rear its head and liberty is known only by 
name...where the dictates of reason and sound policy are smothered by the flood of popular 
opinion.”1  The article continued: 
Have we not seen religion abolished by the authority of the Legislature, its ministers 
forced to emigrated to a distant shore, and Nature and Reason substituted in the room of 
Deity?  Have we not seen morality, not that which is the offspring of utility, expediency 
or the fitness of things, but that which is eternal, immutable, and unalterable as the will of 
Deity, enduring the same fate, and enshrined in the same tomb?  Have we not seen the 
sacred banners of liberty unfurled at the foot of the guillotine, and trampled under the feet 
of the executioner…?  At the recollection of what has there happened, who, O gracious 
Heaven! can withhold a sympathetic tear?2 
 
 What could have led to such a condemnation?   How did the ideologies behind the French 
Revolution play out during and after the event?  Tocqueville’s “classic” observations are a good 
place to start.  He tended to focus more on structural issues than ideological.  He noted, for 
example, the tensions between not only the monarchy and the aristocracy, (the former both 
disenfranchised and privileged the latter), and between the aristocracy and the “Third Estate,”3 
some of whom were increasingly literate.4  He argued that “in France the subversion of 
feudalism by the centralizing monarchy and by the economic avarice of the nobility had 
proceeded further than anywhere else in Europe.”5  As a result, both the monarchy and the 
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nobility were unable (or unwilling) to lead or help the Third Estate, and the latter completely 
supplanted the former.  Perhaps this transition did not need to be violent, but Rousseau’s 
philosophies held too much sway. 
 
Rousseau and Government of Reason 
 There can be little doubt of Rousseau’s influence.  A less critical analyst of the French 
Revolution once noted, “Napoleon said to one of his generals that he wished that [Rousseau] 
would have never been born; the general inquired why he said so, to which Napoleon replied that 
he is the man who has paved the way for Revolution.”6 
Rousseau was never able to reconcile his political rationalism and the absolute nature of 
the “general will” with the popular sovereignty he also espoused.  Bryan Garsten of Yale 
University noted: 
This was a point that dogged Rousseau in book 3 of the Social Contract, where he 
distinguished between sovereignty and government. The reason for that distinction was 
that the legitimacy of the sovereign general will depended on its generality, a generality 
that would be compromised as soon as one adopted particular policies that affected 
different people differently. For Constant, this meant that Rousseau’s understanding of 
popular sovereignty was virtually useless, for it could not be enacted without being 
corrupted.7 
 
Because of the French focus on Rousseau with little attention to Locke or Montesquieu, what on 
the surface looked like French representative republicanism was actually very different.  
“France’s Enlightenment heritage is quite different from English [or American] liberalism. In 
France, the struggle against arbitrary rule or the protection of freedoms was accomplished by 
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paying tribute to the Government of Reason, not by establishing representative procedures.”8 
Part of the problem lay in the inherent contradiction between the absolute nature of the “Cult of 
Reason” on the  one hand and the more “liberal” notion of “Tribute to the Will” on the other.9  
What they sought instead was “a good rational authority based on science.”10 Politics thus 
became “an art of observation and a science of deduction.”11 
 French revolutionaries thought this possible because of their faith in the absolute nature 
of what could be apprehended in politics through human reason.  Rosanvallon quoted 19th 
century historian Docteur Quesnay who said, “Men and their governments make no laws at 
all….  Instead, [t]hey recognize laws as consonant with the Supreme Reason which governs the 
universe.”12 Rosanvallon quotes another 19th-century French historian who asserted, “We do not 
split into parties when we watch a game of chess, nor when we read two different solutions to a 
[the] same geometry problem.”13 
 The French thought that through reason, men could attain absolute unity of opinion and 
purpose.  In order to destroy the old political divisions, then, “there was fierce competition to 
make unity the cardinal value.”14  The French found themselves in the unenviable position of 
being able to participate but not debate.  “French liberty followed Rousseau in emphasizing 
democratic rights to participation but minimized dissent and individual expression…[obsessed] 
with finding consensus and unanimity.”15  20th-century historian James Livesey asserted, 
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“revolutionary republicans were inherently committed to the elimination of any plurality, any 
assertion of particularity.”16 In his dissertation, G.C. Walton argued that “the culture of calumny, 
combined with lingering notions of the sacredness of authority, made political pluralism and 
tolerance of dissent difficult to establish.”17  Indeed, with God and the Bible largely absent in this 
society, both reason and the nation became sacred.  Scholars like Emmet Kennedy18 and French 
historian Pierre Rosanvallon19 refer to the Cult of Reason, while David A Bell observes what he 
calls the Cult of the Nation, employing “religious language and concepts” to convey “a transfer 
of sacrality from the monarch to the nation.”20 
 
Will vs. Reason; Rousseau vs. Montesquieu 
 With such a philosophy, political power could not be distributed evenly.  The first group 
they failed to enfranchise (or keep enfranchised) was the nobility, who were given no voice at all 
in the new government.  Instead, they were forced to “conform to the laws of the Third Estate.”21 
Furthermore, for the vast majority--even of the Third Estate--the right to vote was nothing more 
than “a social status, that of the individual member of a people collectively taking the place of 
the king.”22  Individual voices were drowned out by the all-subsuming notion of “general will,” 
which became “the principal black box of the revolutionary process.”23 The result was that 
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instead of government “by the people,” by a philosophical twist, citizens of the nation became 
enslaved to their own power.  “All the ambiguity is here: in 1789, no one yet dreamed of 
founding an authority entrusted to the people. The nation was the sovereign subject.”24  As 
another put it, the ambiguity of “general will” made it possible “to mask the contract formed 
between the Government of Reason and the sovereignty of the people.”25 Even before the Terror, 
the two-tiered voting system essentially established and preserved a new elite to replace the old 
one.26   
 The Cult of Reason also implied naturally that checks and balances were not only 
unnecessary, but they were also counterproductive.  For the French, there was a “latent hostility 
to Montesquieu” and his ideas of separation of power, which they regarded as “’gothic’ 
principles for fighting absolutism.”27 “In this state of necessary disorder, the idea of establishing 
counterweights to prevent the arbitrary abuses of the sovereign power is obviously fanciful: the 
opposite of arbitrariness is evidence.”28 18th-century historian Le Mercier observed, “Evidence 
must be the very principle of authority because it is tantamount to the uniting of wills.”29 This is 
“the principle of unanimity, the form of universal reason.”30 The rationalizing “law state” 
therefore became an expression of the “Cult of the Law.”31 
 This attitude was apparent in the French attitude towards the American post-
revolutionary efforts at government.  “Enlightenment thinkers supported American 
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emancipation, even while they quickly distanced themselves from the American constitutional 
endeavor, which they found too marked by the spirit of English common law and the balance of 
powers,”32 and which they saw as weakened by the “arbitrariness” of parliamentary debate and 
legislation.33  All this led Rosanvallon to note, “French democracy is not founded on a 
deconstruction of absolutism.  On the contrary, it consists of a reappropriation of it.”34 
 
How Equality Prevented Liberty 
 Previous analysis has shown how the Bible was largely removed from French society.  
Tocqueville's analysis also indirectly betrays the absence of biblical restraint among the French 
populace.  “For Tocqueville, ‘the love of wealth … either as a principal or accessory motive’ 
permeates all of the classes in democratic society.”35 In his analysis of French culture, 
Tocqueville makes no mention of the “hope for a future state” as he did in America.  Instead, 
pervasive themes in the Revolution consistently included “the perfectibility of human nature, 
national identity, and the nature of citizenship.”36 
 As a result, stark differences with the American model stemmed from “the issue of 
autonomous versus subnomous conceptions of personhood”37 mentioned above.  Human rights 
derived not from human dignity as God’s creations, but rather from a rational, utilitarian 
measure: 
Article I of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (August 26, 1789) of 
the French National Assembly states: 'All men are born and remain free and equal in 
rights:  social distinctions can not [sic] be found but on common utility'. This is a total 
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reconfiguration of the meaning of identity along the lines of utility functions rather than 
what may be termed constituted selves.38 
 
 Building on a “rational” foundation for human rights, the French sought a very different 
notion of liberty.  After the Jacobins gained power in 1789 and instituted the Terror of 1793-
1794, they developed what early 18th-century historian Benjamin Constant described as a 
romanticized, “ancient” view of liberty, which unlike the republican model sought “the active 
participation of all citizens in self-government,”39 hypothetically modeled after the ancient Greek 
example.  In effect, they tried to include all citizens directly in government, but as noted above, 
the two-tiered voting system meant this was a thin façade.  In a lecture in 1819, Benjamin 
Constant struggled to explain “why the Jacobins and their followers – and not only they – were 
so easily attracted to such an anachronistic vision of political liberty.”40  He asked a telling 
question:  “Could it be true that the principal threat to freedom in the period after the French 
Revolution was neither the seizure of power by a tyrant nor the application of force by an army, 
but instead citizens’ over-zealous attachment to a certain form of liberty?”41  His appraisal of the 
Jacobins was generous, for he said: “otherwise well-intentioned men caused infinite evils during 
our long and stormy revolution.”42 He justified their actions by positing that “among people who 
have experienced long periods of oppression and subjection, as the French had,” there is a strong 
“longing for beautiful actions,” which they sought from the ancients.43  Constant’s observations 
are noteworthy in light of the paucity of biblical influence in French society.  The French sought 
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ancient “beautiful actions” not in biblical history, but rather in Golden-Age Greece.  The 
Jacobins, Constant said, subscribed to an “illusion” when they “posited that unlimited popular 
sovereignty was legitimate,” and also when they “accepted the separation between the public 
sphere and the private lives of individuals, thus tacitly condoning the social injustice of the old 
regime.”44 When combined with their passionate pursuit of unanimity, the result of universal 
enfranchisement was “majority tyranny.”45 
The absolute nature of Reason and the resulting artificiality of equality transformed the 
notion of freedom.  For the French revolutionaries, “to be free [one has] only to observe the laws 
of nature and conform to them.”46 Rosananvallon summarized 18th-century political historian Le 
Mercier de la Rivière who put it this way: “A liberty, in other words, is in conforming to nature, 
while oppression comes only from a wayward human will.”47 Freedom was not self-
determination, but rather subjection of will to the absolute nature of reason.  Indeed, this “led to 
the exhalation of the abstract individual, free from all determinacy, [a] simple member of the 
social All.”48 
As mentioned above, for the French, human equality necessarily meant unanimity.  Even 
as early as 1750, Tocqueville claimed, the French “were unenthusiastic in their regard for liberty 
as compared with their passionate desire for equality.”49 To achieve this unanimous equality, 
they were forced to consolidate power.  Tocqueville said the French were committed to the idea 
that “centralization must increase,”50 and in the process of their “radical” changes," they 
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effectively “swept away” many of the conditions necessary for the preservation of freedom.51  
French historians often refer to the “Jacobin impulse in French political culture,” otherwise 
branded “the political culture of generality,” a hostility towards intermediary bodies in favor of 
an extreme form of individual liberty, along with a “deep attraction to a tutelary state that aimed 
to remake individuals into worthy citizens.”52 This is sometimes referred to as the 
“Revolutionary cult of generality,” a yearning for le grand tout and “the centralizing impulse as 
the requirement of modern administration.”53 
Tocqueville's analysis is revealing.  As mentioned previously, he traveled to the U.S. to 
discover why both equality and liberty could coexist there, while in France, “equality threatened 
to undermine liberty.”54 In fact, his experiences with the French Revolution were so bad that he 
developed his “universal history of the deleterious influence of equality on political liberty,”55 
becoming “extremely pessimistic regarding the long-term consequences of democracy.”56 He 
believed that “even in America despotic rule would eventually triumph.”57 
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The National Assembly & the Failure of Democracy 
  With only a rational, utilitarian notion of humanity and morality, unrestrained violence 
marked the Revolution from the beginning.  Years before the Terror officially began, this was 
already apparent in the “grisly spectacle of the crowd enthusiastically encouraging a pastry cook 
named Desnot to hack De Launey, the governor of the Bastille, to pieces on the corner of the 
Place de Grève.”58 In fact, the sacred nature of the “general will” also led later to the 
extrajudicial execution of the king. “Saint-Just demanded that the King not be tried but simply 
executed as a rebel, outside the social contract that would give him any legal protection,”59 lest 
the king wind up being the one “trying the People themselves.”60 
 By the time the National Assembly replaced the Estates General, they were set up for 
failure.  Edmond Burke, an Englishman who famously predicted as early as 1790 “the unraveling 
and collapse of the whole French government,”61 based his conclusion largely on an analysis of 
the National Assembly.  One problem, he ironically noted, was that so many “commoners” had 
been swept into power (“there [were] not quite fifty persons possessed of an income amounting 
to 100£ sterling yearly”)62 that they were vulnerable to financial corruption.  As political theorist 
William Selinger notes, Burke asserted the National Assembly “was far too formally powerful 
and unchecked, the number of profit-seeking actors gaming to take advantage of it far too 
numerous, and its leaders far too inexperienced.”63  Selinger further describes his position: 
 The colossal political power of the National Assembly meant opportunity, according to 
Burke, for anyone with economic ambition. The whole rising French middle class saw 
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possibilities, both political and pecuniary, in the emerging political order that the 
National Assembly was crafting...a landscape of corrupt (and potentially corrupt) 
actors....64 
 
Burke's analysis was remarkable.  Despite the absolute power of the National Assembly, their 
financial self-interest meant its members were collectively unable to stand against the “moneyed 
interest”65 (financial elite) of the nation, as demonstrated by their confiscation of church lands to 
pay the nation's debt--rather than merely declaring debts of the former “illegitimate” regime 
void.66  What's more, their attack on the monarchy demonstrated they could not overcome their 
“dependence on impoverished lower classes.”67 The result, Burke said, was “a National 
Assembly which on the one hand has acquired the entirety of legislative sovereignty, as well as 
deep control over judicial and executive functions,” but was essentially “impotent.”68  Burke's 
prediction of the National Assembly's demise was remarkable.  As Selinger summarizes, 
“Caught between rival powers, the National Assembly will ultimately be forced to draw on the 
army.  But the Assembly will no more be able to ensure the army’s loyalty than anyone else’s. 
Burke foresaw that the Revolution would end in a military coup.”69 
 Rousseau’s philosophy, combined with the structural and [ir]religious issues in French 
society, doomed the National Assembly to failure.  As a result, despite the “moderate 
accomplishments of the Constituent Assembly” during the early years of the French Revolution 
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(1789-92),70 by the time of the radical period of the Terror (1793-94),71 it could be confidently 
observed that “French democracy failed during the 1790s.”72 
 
 
The Terror 
 Rousseau’s irreconcilable philosophical forces of Reason and Will eventually collided 
during the Jacobin Republic of 1793-1794, “the most repressive and violent moment of the 
Revolution.”73  The Jacobin Terror (which began in 1793 and culminated in June and July 1794) 
was particularly noted for “systematic, state-sponsored violence, and an apparatus of trials and 
executions decreed by a government in power.”74  The irony was clear:  “The violence of the 
Jacobin Terror is of a relatively small scale compared to later horrors; its brutality comes not 
from sheer numbers but from its context. How could a movement that proclaimed universal 
human rights kill in the name of those rights?”75   
At the same time, the Terror was inevitable.  By this time, “the discourse of will, which 
was identified with Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty, triumphed and pointed the 
revolutionaries in the direction of the Terror.”76 Dr. Jennifer Heuer of the University of 
Massachussetts Amherst notes an “increasing inability of revolutionaries to use their analytical 
frameworks to predict or explain events.”77 “[The] sense of growing anarchy contributed to the 
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breakdown of collective identities and controls on violence.”78 The result was that political 
divisions “became matters of life and death.”79   
Problems lay in the “religious” belief that reason leads necessarily to universals, as well 
as in utilitarian concepts of humanity and morality.  Furet, noted in the previous chapter as a 
20th-century revisionist and anti-totalitarian scholar, noted that in the Revolution, “each 
individual could arrogate to himself what had been a divine monopoly....  If he then found 
obstacles standing in his way, he attributed them to the perversity of adverse wills rather than to 
the opacity of things; the Terror’s sole purpose was to do away with those adversaries.”80 
Another problem lay in the society’s rejection of religious restraint.  “The Terror 
occurred when imagination, in the sense of the ability to reinterpret basic norms of public life, 
was neither constrained by society nor by culture and was instead actively controlled by fear.”81 
The lack of restraint had clear origins, as the more “irreligious” elements of the Enlightenment 
“set the tone for the French Revolution during the Terror's ‘de-Christianization’ phase in 1793 
and again in 1797-1799.”82  In this phase, there was a “‘philosophic’ intolerance of even the pro-
revolutionary Catholic clergy”83  It is also commonly held that “a certain illiberal interpretation 
of Rousseau's political thought set the tone of the Robespierrian or ‘great’ Terror.”84 
In the series of counterrevolutions over the following years, it became clear that human 
life was no longer sacred.  As identities and sides shifted, “Labeling enemies often involved 
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dehumanizing them, a mechanism that made it easier to reconcile the rights of man with state-
sponsored violence.”85  
 
Thermidor, Directory, and Empire 
Eventually, even the Terror turned on those who first instigated it with the Thermidorian 
Reaction and the 5-member governing Directory, which together “eliminated the revolutionary 
vanguard that had come to stand for nothing other than the charisma of revolution and allowed a 
new renegotiation of the treaty, ending the cycle of contention between different partners.”86 
Beginning in 1797, this series of upheavals--repeated attempts to “make the republic work”87--
eventually undid the republic altogether.  In 1797, a coup targeted “royal machinations.”88  The 
next year, another coup purged “neo-Jacobins” and “ostensibly saved the republic, [but] 
ultimately crippled it by delegitimizing it.”89  In 1799, after what some describe as another rise of 
new Jacobins, the year ended with the culmination of a gradual and subtle “Brumaire coup” in 
which Napoleon rose to power and consolidated “liberal authoritarianism.”90 
The immediate result was that the French people, “exhausted by revolution” and the 
violence of the Terror, found in Napoleon a “legitimate despotic government,”91 a “plebiscitary 
dictatorship.”92 After this, Napoleon demonstrated “his famed ability to connect with ordinary 
people and his understanding of new forms of warfare”93 and arguably became the first leader to 
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wield populism and nationalism as juggernaut forces.  In 1804 he was finally crowned as 
emperor.94  Herein lay the greatest irony of the French Revolution.  France famously 
“proclaim[ed] a republic and an end to royalty for all time, only to embrace an Emperor a few 
years later.”95 
For Cabanis, the French physician-philosopher who sought to establish “the science of 
man and society,” Napoleon’s consolidation of power was:  
the fulfillment of the physiological assumptions of the science of man:  the timeless 
body-politic metaphor of government as a living mechanism whose organs achieved an 
equilibrium in which all systems worked for a common purpose. The constitution was an 
empirically developed product of historical change. Government was an agency of human 
perfectibility to satisfy physical and moral needs, encourage the exercise of human 
faculties, safeguard liberty, direct laws and good habits, and restrain harmful passions.96 
 
Series of Governments 
 Cabanis’ dreams were not to be realized.  Beginning with Napoleon, one legacy of the 
French Revolution was “France's extensive involvement in every general European war of the 
eighteenth century and its largely unsuccessful military and economic competition with Britain, 
Prussia, and Austria.”97 Napoleon’s bellicose nature led to further political upheavals.  After the 
First Republic, weakened by the Terror, dissolved into the First Empire of Napoleon, the Second 
Republic eventually dissolved into the Second Empire of his nephew.  
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The Third Republic, which came nearly a century after the Revolution, was according to 
Furet “the ultimate victory of Republicans over monarchists.”98 In it, he believed, the 
Revolutionary promise of 1789 – democracy and human rights – was largely fulfilled.99  Other 
appraisals are more somber.  According to Rosanvallon, the Third Republic’s democratic 
achievements were “moderate,” including “French democracy's belated appropriation of the 
pluralist impulses of civil society.”100 The Third Republic sought to replace “illiberal Jacobin 
democracy” with “balanced democracy,” but due to its inherent instability, Rosanvallon 
dismisses as a “flawed achievement.”101   
Whatever successes the Third Republic might have brought, many historians do not see it 
as the end of the Revolutionary era, because “[t]he hour of its birth was also the 1880s, when 
socialism and communism began their meteoric rise in Europe”102 Indeed, “Lenin portrayed 
himself as the new Robespierre, and the Bolsheviks as the new Jacobins.”103 In the 20th century, 
there was widespread support from the French Left for the 1917 Revolution in Russia.104 As 
Furet put it, “the heritage of Jacobinism filtered down through Russian populism,” and yet Lenin 
would add “science” to the political equation, as a more complete “substitute for religion that 
was so sorely lacking in late eighteenth-century France.”105 
The Third Republic fell to the Nazis, and the post-WWII Fourth Republic collapsed in 
1958, leading to today's Fifth Republic.  Remarkably, while reviewing a book by Rosanvallon, 
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Harvard University’s Cheryl B. Welch notes that not until the 1970s was there a true 
“repudiation of totalitarianism” in French political culture.106  Even well into the Fifth Republic, 
the legacy of Rousseau and the Jacobins led to a “new alignment with socialism, because of its 
utopian aspirations,” the youth revolt of 1968, and the Socialist Party’s taking power in 1981 
with their slogan, “change life” a slogan that later “became subsumed by harsh realities of 
governance.”107 
Furet’s writings indicate his opinion, too, that despite the Third Republic’s successes, 
“the Revolution may even have lasted into the 1970s.”108  Historians note “exceptional weakness 
in French development:  a 'tradition of centralization and the permanent illiberal temptation 
stemming from the absolutization of popular sovereignty and the state's claim to institute and 
instruct society.’”109 
 
A Pattern of Centralization 
 The legacy of the French Revolution was centralization of power and even a heavy 
tendency towards totalitarianism.  Tocqueville, who did not live to see the Third Republic, 
insisted “the primary consequence of the Revolution was the continuity and intensification of 
bureaucratic centralization.”110 Initially, they expanded the state in response to “wretched and 
miserable conditions of a newly working class…[through] redistribution of wealth and 
property.”111 An unintended consequence of each counter-revolution was “the strengthening of 
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the demand for a state to enforce equality.”112 Ultimately, instead of “the realization of freedom,” 
they found “the imposition of despotic rule under Napoleon.”113 Tocqueville warned that 
“despotic” government “occurs gradually, almost insensibly, as administrators in democratic 
ages seek to limit the economic uncertainty experienced by an entire category of citizens, the 
workers. In the end, despotic government serves the population by providing for its welfare.”114 
Tocqueville’s was a prescient warning for the years following his death. 
20th-century revisionist explanations of the Revolution’s outcomes are also telling.  For 
them, the “elimination of representative institutions through political centralization” combined 
with the “Rousseauvian belief” in both “direct democracy” and “general will,” in the end “could 
not allow the free expression of political differences.”115 The late Steven G. Gey, known for his 
advocacy of separation of church and state, put it more bluntly:  “Even in its most benign 
applications the French position contains the seeds of a distinctly antiliberal statism.”116 
 François Furet, the revisionist historian who left the French communist party in 1956 and 
later challenged Marxist interpretations of the Revolution,117 saw Jacobinism as forming the 
origins of the “totalitarian age,”118 insofar as any such movement typically “takes power by 
means of enforced political conformity, terror and a willingness to commit mass murder.”119 To 
him, Jacobinism began as a “liberation movement” that was “initially attractive because of its 
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notions of freedom of harmony”120 but transformed into a “party of terror,”121 a “force behind 
repression and violence.”122 Furet noted that Jacobinism’s “universalist notion of harmony,” 
despite its aims at “creating harmony in a new society,” led instead to “rigid distinctions between 
friend and foe.”  Then later when its “orthodoxy” changed rapidly, it “brooked no opposition” 
and sought “restoration of internal unity through purges.”123  
 For Furet, herein lay the “mental foundations” of totalitarianism: “the absolute will to 
change, the utopian promise of the future, a Manichean worldview, the readiness to commit 
violence stemming from these premises and the symbolic pseudo-participation of the people in 
politics.”124  Revisionist scholar David Bell, in what James Livesey describes as an example of 
“revisionist rewriting of the French Revolution around the Terror,”125 goes further, seeing in the 
Terror the original inspiration for modern-day terrorism:  
Before ‘Global Terrorism’ and ‘the war on terrorism’ there was the Terror:  the radical 
climax of the French Revolution, set to the grisly music of the guillotine.  Its architects 
and executioners were the first people widely called ‘terrorists’, and the first to be widely 
known for embracing fear as their principal political weapon. For nearly two centuries, 
their actions stained the political imagination of the West as little else has.126 
 
 Even in the 19th century, Hegel focused on “how the revolutionaries’ efforts to institute a 
radically new conception of human freedom – absolute freedom – were essentially self-
undermining,” because their own principles forced them “to turn on themselves and to destroy 
the very institutions of freedom that they themselves created.”127  For him, “the revolution sought 
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to realize something that was, in principle, unrealizable.”128 David Ciavatta, a scholar who 
studied Hegel’s observations, noted the slippery slope into authoritarianism, for “such a law can 
maintain its force only on the condition that some citizens and not others – some sort of policing 
agents, for example – are designated as its enforcers.”129 How, when, and where to apply this law 
will then “always be a matter of particular judgments that ultimately rest on their individual 
shoulders.”130  Another expression of this authoritarian tendency has been to limit freedom of 
speech.  The “famed universalism” of the Revolution made suspect any group that attempted to 
mediate between the individual and the state, and “freedom of expression (article 11 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man of Citizen in 1789) often gave way to new forms of censorship, 
including restrictions on the press.”131 As Dr. Jennifer Heuer put it, “Even champions of human 
rights for oppressed minorities often imagined a regenerated and increasingly uniform nation.”132 
 
Continued Distrust of Religion 
 The revolutionary backlash against Roman Catholic power, particularly in the absence of 
Reformation or biblical influence, led to a continued distrust of religion in post-revolutionary 
France.  “French laïcité really did more than separate church and state. It served to 
institutionalize state suspicion of religious activity as potentially harmful to the interests of the 
nation.”133 This distrust of religion reinforced centralization of power.  Tocqueville did a 
remarkable job explaining how without God, a citizen must turn elsewhere for help:   
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His independence fills him with self-reliance and pride amongst his equals; his debility 
makes him feel from time to time the want of some outward assistance, which he cannot 
expect from any of them, because they are all impotent and unsympathizing. In this 
predicament, he naturally turns his eyes to that imposing power [the state]...until he 
ultimately views it as the sole and necessary support of his own weakness.134 
 
In the end, Tocqueville warned, the “age of despotism” is marked by “the fulfillment of the 
citizens’ desire for economic certainty by a welfare state,” for they see the government as “the 
sole agent and the only arbiter of [their] happiness.”135   
 Part of the irreligious impulse was a response to Roman Catholic power.  In his 1819 
discourse, Constant distinguished between “sacerdotal religions” (those that “empowered a 
priestly caste”) and alternatives.136 While he associated sacerdotal religions with “repressive 
societies,” instead of associating the alternative with biblical, Reformation churches, he saw an 
ideal in the “‘independent’ religiosity of the Greeks.”137 
He held a materialistic view of religion as a whole.  For him, “religious sentiment was 
essentially a longing for transcendence,”138 and yet that longing led people “to give up their 
freedom to priests claiming to represent the voice of God.”139 For Constant, “religious sentiments 
cannot be eliminated from the human psyche, and yet they are dangerous when allowed into 
politics.” He proposed that people should “satisfy or indulge these sentiments without ceding 
power to outside authorities,” to find “a form of spirituality or religiosity that is more supportive 
of autonomy than traditional religions, less prone to being used as a tool in our oppression.”140 In 
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the spirit of the ancient Greek model of polytheism, he proposed “an especially tolerant, 
romanticized and anti-doctrinal sort of Protestantism” to fulfill the “political and psychological 
functions… important to liberal society.”141 Such a model, he believed, “both indulges our need 
for illusions and helps us to resist their worst effects.”142 Some have referred to Constant’s 1819 
discourse as “post-post-revolutionary” because of its “overemphasis on rationality and self-
interest that had emerged as one response to the Terror.”143  
This is not to say there were no powerful religious impulses in French history.  The Reign 
of Terror led to religious (Catholic) revival, but the official separation of Church and State 
followed in 1795.144 A few years later, the 1801 Concordat between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII 
“restored to the Church many of the privileges it had enjoyed under the ancien régime.”145 When 
Napoleon fell, the Bourbon Restoration from 1814-1830 also saw the Catholic Church regaining 
much power and influence.   
These gains were temporary, though, because the French by this time had largely 
internalized the Enlightenment conviction that religion, “with its claims of exclusivity and a 
historical tendency to use power to enforce those claims, has in its very nature something that 
poses a danger to liberty of conscience.”146 The resulting “divorce between public and private 
religious regimes” congealed into “an anticlerical secularism” that took nearly final form in the 
Third Republic (1870-1940) and was written into law with the official Separation of Church and 
State of 1905.147 The 1905 law was considered a protection against the Roman Catholic Church.  
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“In France, the law of 9 December 1905 that separated churches from the state overturned 
centuries of Catholic privilege within French borders.”148  
By 1905, then, religious practice became severely restricted.  After passage of the law, 
“Religious practice was free only within a narrowly defined concept of religious worship and 
ritual.”149 As a result, “separation of church and state in France did not prove to be the boon to 
religion that it was in the early American republic.”150 Martha Nussbaum goes so far as to 
describe this as “the French tradition of 'coercive assimilation.’”151 R. Lawrence Moore of 
Cornell University notes while critiquing Nussbaum’s work, “Even secular liberals in the United 
States...would probably agree...that the American tradition of ‘separation of church and state’ is 
more protective than French laïcité of each person’s space for both belief and religious 
practice.”152  
 
Church, State, & School 
 For the French, official secularization and public schools arrived simultaneously.  Moore 
summarizes it well: 
The French, in laws adopted in 1881 and 1882, before the 1905 law, set up secular public 
schools that were intended to take from the Catholic Church its monopoly control over 
French education. The same series of laws that ended religious instruction in the state 
schools also dissolved the Jesuits, abolished chaplains in the French military, and 
removed nuns from their role in hospitals.153 
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The French approach to school derives directly from Rousseau’s ideas.  “For 
Enlightenment thinkers, schooling, along with freedom of the press, was the principal vector for 
the diffusion of Reason.”154 This point underscores “the state’s task of public education.”155  As 
Le Mercier observed, “A government must be the principal teacher of its subjects.”156  More than 
training people for technical development, the state has “the goal of training rational men and 
citizens.”157  Indeed the state “is conceived as a pedagogue, as society’s teacher.”158 In essence, 
“educational activity [is] the condition by which the general will can be made rational.”159  
Because the state’s pedagogic role is tied to Rousseau’s faith in the absolute nature of 
what can be apprehended through reason, the state further concentrated power in the educational 
system.  Like in America, the French seek to maximize individual liberty in matters of education.  
While America protects religious groups and parents’ rights, though, the French “identify 
religious liberty as a right adhering to individuals rather than to communities.”160 Professor 
Jeremy Gunn notes, “Whereas ‘religious freedom’ in the United States typically bears the nuance 
of freedom of religion from the state, in France laïcité often bears the connotation of the state 
protecting citizens from the excesses of religion.”161  
The result is that France has consistently sought to render their educational system 
completely devoid of religion.  “In France, the government is seeking to create a limited area in 
which especially vulnerable students are free to consider all ideas and possibilities, temporarily 
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free from the constraints imposed on them by the religious and social mandates of their 
community and family...[in effect, to create] a ‘religious coercion free zone.’”162 This leads to 
what one analyst calls a “somewhat paradoxical regulatory framework:  only by prohibiting each 
student from manifesting a particular religious stance can the government provide the conditions 
in which the student can exercise the freedom to decide whether or not to adopt that religious 
stance in the first place.”163  
Steven G. Gey summarizes the French position on religion and education with five 
points:  1) religious liberty is “an individual rather than a group phenomenon,” 2) public 
education seeks “to introduce students to a world of ideas and experiences to which the students 
may not have access in their home or community environment--even if that exposure potentially 
undercuts the students’ religious training,” 3) religious liberty of students is clearly distinguished 
from that of their parents, 4) public education is responsible for protecting students--even young 
children--from “the subtly coercive group dynamics of religious communities,” and 5) separation 
of church and state means the government is a strictly secular domain, which means “to preserve 
the structure of religious liberty for everyone, religion must be consigned to the private 
sector.”164  
 
Modern Challenges 
 In today’s Fifth Republic, France has struggled to cope with three forces:  globalization 
(and a resultant loss of sovereignty), consumerism, and immigration.165  The French have not 
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been prepared for multiculturalism.  Indeed, “French public opinion is strikingly negative 
towards the discourse of globalization, identifying it with liberalism run amuck.”166 Because the 
French system “is much more centralized, and its experience with religious diversity much more 
circumscribed,”167 for most of its history, “policies of laïcité were easier to standardize than any 
American jurist’s version of church-state separation.”168 This changed with heavy 20th-century 
immigration from Algeria, which has posed a tremendous challenge to reconcile public good 
with religious rights (such as to wear the hijab).169  Britain's “left-wing daily,” The Guardian, 
once declared that the 20th century decline of Christianity in France, and Europe as a whole, 
only reinforced the French liberal tradition's sense of its own superiority and historical 
inevitability; the assumption was that wealth and time would between them kill off the 
last vestiges of religious faith. But this has not proved true of France's Muslims, and now, 
disastrously, liberalism has resorted to the full force of the law to buttress its 
supremacy.170 
 
Today there are between four and five million Muslims in France,171 roughly 10 percent of the 
population, and their presence “has changed the nature of the debate about laïcité, and not just 
with respect to Islam.”172 
Partly in response to frequent gang-rape of Muslim girls by Muslim boys in their own 
neighborhoods (so common they were referred to as “pass-arounds”),173 France passed a law in 
2004 banning the wearing of the hijab in French schools.  Their much-debated solution was to 
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continue to assume “individual free choice [in this case, the girls’ right to decide not to wear the 
hijab] should always be favored over the preservation of a community's religious purity.”174 In 
effect, the only way to protect Muslim girls’ religious rights was to prevent them from 
expressing it in school.  Despite France’s hope that this would protect Muslim girls, response to 
the law outside of France was generally negative. 
Another challenge has been women’s’ rights.  France’s treatment of women may be said 
to have turned out well.  Dr. Jennifer Heuer, who wrote on the subject of the family during the 
Revolution, noted that many new civil laws were created for women in the early years, though 
the 1790s saw much erosion of women’s opportunities.175  Indeed, 1793 was a turning point 
“after which women were definitely excluded from political participation.”176 During the Jacobin 
Republic, even as the regime limited women’s political power, however, “it reinforced their civil 
rights.”177  French women got the right to vote only a few decades after American women did. 
Finally, with respect to economic performance, capitalism came late for France.  As 
mentioned above, in the French Revolution, “Both the middle class and the peasantry were 
hostile to incipient capitalism, as was much of the legislation of the revolution itself.”178 As a 
result, “the revolution was ‘a triumph for the conservative, propertied, land-owning classes, large 
and small’ and contributed to the economic backwardness of nineteenth-century France.”179 
France’s 20th-century socialism may have contributed to their ranking below 48 individual 
American states in economic performance, another point mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Analysis 
The research shows that the ideological underpinnings of the American and French 
Revolutions were vastly different.  The ideology behind the American Revolution was a 
combination of biblical Reformation thought and Enlightenment thought in a cultural milieu rich 
with biblical influence.  The ideology behind the French Revolution, on the other hand, was a 
much purer form of Enlightenment thought that included a nearly wholesale rejection of the 
Bible.  As noted in the previous two chapters, the outcomes for both nations were equally 
different.  This has led James Livesey to conclude “the relationship between the French 
Revolution and the history of democracy, which had once seemed so vital, is now highly 
contested.”1   
This is not to assert ideological determinism.2 After all, the “precise causal significance 
of ideas” in events like these revolutions is an “intriguing problem.”3  Still, ideas do matter.  
David Wilsford of Université de Paris and University of California, San Diego has posited that 
structural explanations are insufficient.  Instead, he proposes that ideas serve as a critical 
“intervening variable” between the realities that precede a revolution and the event itself.4  Mary 
Nolan, professor of history at New York University, notes the impact of particular ideas in 
revolutionary France:  “By the mid-1790s, the French who still supported the revolution were 
shaping and being shaped by the ideas debated in the sections and clubs, by the symbolism and 
vision of the revolutionary celebrations, and by…iconography….”5  
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Instead of ideological determinism, then, the author of this paper concludes there are 
certainly “ideological propensities.”  There can be little doubt that a major factor in the widely 
divergent outcomes of the American and French Revolutions is the ubiquitous presence of the 
Bible in pre-revolutionary American society, as well as in the centuries that have followed, and 
its near absence in French society.  As Chaya Halberstam asserts, “‘biblical religion’ serves in 
many ways as a precursor to, and a source of, our own democratic and egalitarian ideals.”6  If 
this is true, the corollary may also be true:  that the absence of the Bible retarded democratic 
development in France.  The French experiment all too often led not to what Tocqueville 
described in America as “democracy to the profit of its citizens,” but rather it led to “democratic 
pathology:  despotism.”7   
Modernity has been in conflict with the biblical worldview since the Renaissance, and 
certainly since the Counter-Reformation and Enlightenment.  Mary Nolan, professor of history at 
New York University, identifies a commonality in states with “high modernist schemes,” a term 
she borrows from political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott.8 “These states, which 
have come in communist, fascist, and democratic variants, share a set of assumptions about 
knowledge, progress, science, and society that can be harnessed to a variety of different 
ideological projects” (emphasis mine).9 What's more, in their modernist nature, these states 
“greatly increase the possibility that violence will be considered legitimate and necessary, even 
progressive.”10 She continues: 
These assumptions and commitments can produce distinctly modern forms of violence 
that are rationally planned and executed and then legitimated, in terms of both the 
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ideologies to which they are linked and the values of science, productivism, and 
rationalization. These are forms of violence for which vengeance and religion do not 
provide a satisfactory explanation, for this is the dark side of modernity that is rooted in 
modernity, not in the persistence of Old Regime beliefs, elites, and institutions.11 
 
The justification of violence that stemmed from these modernist ideas also extended into 
imperial exercise:  “In the name of science, market rationality, productivism, and progress, they 
have imposed expert knowledge over local knowledge in their efforts to reshape nature and 
society along modernist lines.”12  The results of modernist imperialism have also often been 
violent. 
 It is important to note that these comparisons are specifically for institutional violence, 
not personal violence, as exemplified by the Terror and later by the Stalinist purges and the 
Fascist Holocaust, all events deriving from modernist ideals.  While the numbers related to the 
Terror are comparatively small, the ideological propensity of modernism for institutional 
violence is clear.  
 Not only were ideas important, but also matters of character related to divergent ideas of 
moral subordination to God or complete individual moral autonomy.  Edmund Burke, the 
Englishman who predicted the failure of the French Revolution, concluded the solution to the 
corruption that led the National Assembly to failure “was to cultivate the character and judgment 
of Members and voters, rather than [merely] to open up the House of Commons to more popular 
involvement.”13  Research in the previous chapter already made it clear that Rousseau’s 
antibiblical foundation led to illiberal consolidation of power.  Edmund Burke’s analysis implies 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 554. 
13 Selinger, “Patronage and Revolution,” 46. 
98 
 
 
it also left the National Assembly vulnerable to corruption.  This combination led to a nearly 
complete loss of liberty in post-Revolutionary France. 
 Not only are political and civil liberties at risk under a modernist worldview, but even 
scientific progress.  John Oswalt of Asbury Theological Seminary asserted that the 
Enlightenment attempt to divorce logic and science from the metaphysical foundation of biblical 
thought—the attempt to make logic and science “stand on their own”—has left science 
“defenseless against the old gods.”14 As a result, logic and science have begun to destroy 
themselves, and humanity has begun a retreat to the pursuit of survival, dominance, comfort, and 
pleasure.15  Where logic and science fall short, it follows that economic performance will 
likewise founder.  While a causal relationship is difficult to establish with certainty, there is an 
apparent correlation between America’s and France’s respective views of the Bible and their 
divergent economic performance. 
 The implications are that the more the Bible prevails in a society, the greater the 
propensity to establish and maintain civil and political liberties, freedom from institutional 
violence, scientific progress, and economic prosperity,  
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CHAPTER 7 - Conclusions 
Pre-revolutionary American society was rich with Scriptural influence, a “biblically 
literate society” that was the product of the First and Second Great Awakening.  The greatest 
theological conflict lay between Protestant Christianity and Deism, and both sought to live 
within a “Christian society.”  James Byrd also demonstrated that colonial ministers employed the 
Bible extensively for support in the revolutionary effort, though certainly not without 
controversy.  Finally, while American revolutionaries doubtless drew heavily from 
Enlightenment thought, they also drew heavily from Reformation thought, and even much of the 
former was Reformation thought distilled into secular form. 
Because of this relative theological consensus, the outcome of the American Revolution 
was an “open marketplace of religion” where its practice was encouraged.  Tocqueville noted 
Americans’ “enlightened self-interest,” which led to cooperation and public participation.  The 
American notion of liberty meant they expected controversy and dispute, and they engineered a 
political system to accommodate it.  Human rights were secured because of their sacred nature 
and man’s morally subordinate position under Divine authority, and as Tocqueville noted, 
equality coexisted with liberty.  Even with America’s secularization, which came much later than 
in France, in America’s public schools, the rights of the state have deferred to those of religious 
groups, and courts have protected parents’ rights to shape their children’s religious upbringing.  
The United States has also seen unparalleled economic growth and strength throughout its 
history. 
In pre-revolutionary France, however, the Roman Catholic Church not only suppressed 
Reformation thought but also secured significant power and influence, tying itself inextricably to 
the French monarchy.  This led not only to a backlash against Catholic power but also against the 
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Bible itself in the decades leading up to the Revolution.  Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet did much 
to reverse the approach to science, seeing it not as the product of God’s mind but instead seeing 
God as the product of man’s mind.  They, along with Rousseau, replaced the absolute God with a 
faith in the absolute nature of Reason and what could be apprehended through its practice.  
Cabanis replaced religion with “scientific” ideology.    
The results were severe anticlericalism and a complete divorce between the public sphere 
and the private practice of religion, a militant form of laïcité.  The Cult of Reason led people to 
expect and pursue unanimity as legislators sought simply to “recognize laws as consonant with 
the Supreme Reason which governs the universe.”16  As Reason came into conflict with Will, the 
Cult of the Nation and the morally autonomous individual transformed liberty into conformity 
with Reason.  In an ironic twist, conforming to Nature became liberty, while any wayward 
expression of free will became oppression.  Instead of separation of power, the French result was 
consolidation of power in the National Assembly, the Directorate, and finally Napoleon.  Instead 
of political stability, France has seen frequent and violent political upheavals as the nation 
swerved between failed attempts at republicanism and periods of empire or restored monarchy. 
The French pattern of centralization has played out economically with delayed capitalism 
and a recent tendency towards socialism, and France has been outpaced economically by 48 of 
the 50 United States.  Centralization has also played out in French schools, where individual 
rights are favored so much over those of religious groups or parents that in order to preserve 
individual religious liberty, French schools cannot permit overt individual practice of it. 
While the American Revolution gave birth to modern republican democracy, scholars no 
longer view the French Revolution as an obvious part of the birth of modern democracy.  The 
                                               
16 Rosanvallon, “Political Rationalism and Democracy in France in the 18th and 19th Centuries,” 688. 
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clearest variable in this comparison is the ubiquity of the Bible in pre-revolutionary American 
society and its near absence in pre-revolutionary France.  Analysis in the previous chapter 
suggested a direct ideological line between “biblical religion” and “democratic or egalitarian 
ideals.”17  Likewise, it suggested a direct line between modernism and both “democratic 
pathology:  despotism”18 and the institutional violence of the Terror.  Additionally, there is an 
apparent correlation between America’s and France’s respective views of the Bible and their 
divergent economic performance. 
 The research indicates the greatest hope any nation has for creating and enjoying political 
liberties, civil liberties, freedom of religion, freedom from institutional violence, scientific 
progress, and economic prosperity is to permit and encourage the reading and application of the 
Bible, allowing it to transform society from within. 
 
 
                                               
17 Chaya Halberstam, “Created Equal,” 422. 
18 Wilsford, “The ‘Conjoncture’ of Ideas and Interests,” 358. 
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